United Nations S/2002/53

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 January 2002

Original: English

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions, including resolutions 779 (1992) of 6 October 1992, 981 (1995) of 31 March 1995, 1088 (1996) of 12 December 1996, 1147 (1998) of 13 January 1998, 1183 (1998) of 15 July 1998, 1222 (1999) of 15 January 1999, 1252 (1999) of 15 July 1999, 1285 (2000) of 13 January 2000, 1307 (2000) of 13 July 2000, 1335 (2001) of 12 January 2001, 1357 (2001) of 21 June 2001 and 1362 (2001) of 11 July 2001,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 2 January 2002 (S/2002/1) on the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP),

Recalling also the letters to its President from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia of 28 December 2001 (S/2001/1301) and from the Permanent Representative of Croatia of 7 January 2002 (S/2002/29), concerning the disputed area of Prevlaka,

Reaffirming once again its commitment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia within its internationally recognized borders,

Noting once again the Joint Declaration signed at Geneva on 30 September 1992 by the Presidents of the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in particular articles 1 and 3 thereof the latter reaffirming their agreement concerning the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula, and the Agreement on Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 23 August 1996 (S/1996/706, annex),

Noting with satisfaction that the overall situation in the UNMOP area of responsibility has remained stable and calm, and encouraged by the agreement of both sides to establish an interstate Border Commission,

Commending the role played by UNMOP, and noting also that the presence of the United Nations military observers continues to be important in maintaining conditions that are conducive to a negotiated settlement of the disputed issue of Prevlaka,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of the United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994 and the statement of its President of 10 February 2000 (S/PRST/2000/4),

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1. *Authorizes* the United Nations military observers to continue monitoring the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula, in accordance with resolutions 779 (1992) and 981 (1995) and paragraphs 19 and 20 of the report of the Secretary-General of 13 December 1995 (S/1995/1028), until 15 July 2002, and requests the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council where appropriate;

2. *Reiterates* its calls upon the parties to cease all violations of the demilitarized regime in the United Nations designated zones, to cooperate fully with the United Nations military observers and to ensure their safety and full and unrestricted freedom of movement;

3. *Welcomes* continuing progress in the normalization of relations between the Governments of the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the establishment of an interstate Border Commission, and urges the parties to accelerate efforts towards a negotiated settlement on the disputed issue of Prevlaka in accordance with article 4 of the Agreement on Normalization of Relations;

4. *Encourages* the parties to consider all confidence-building measures, including the options provided to them pursuant to resolution 1252 (1999), that could help facilitate a solution to the disputed issue of Prevlaka;

5. *Requests* the parties to continue to report at least bimonthly to the Secretary-General on the status of their bilateral negotiations and on progress in beginning the work of the interstate Border Commission;

6. *Requests* the United Nations military observers and the multinational stabilization force authorized by the Council in resolution 1088 (1996) of 12 December 1996 and extended by resolution 1357 (2001) of 21 June 2001 to cooperate fully with each other;

7. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2002/54

Security Council

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Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999 and 1333 (2000) of 19 December 2000,

Noting that Ariana Afghan Airlines is no longer owned, leased or operated by or on behalf of the Taliban, nor are its funds and other financial resources owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Taliban,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* that the provisions of paragraph 4 (a) and (b) of resolution 1267 (1999) do not apply to Ariana Afghan Airlines aircraft or Ariana Afghan Airlines funds and other financial resources;

2. *Decides* to terminate the measure provided for by paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 1333 (2000);

3. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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United Nations S/2002/55

Security Council

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16 January 2002

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

(for the period from 21 July 2001 to 16 January 2002)

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1365 (2001) of 31 July 2001, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further period of six months, until 31 January 2002. It covers developments since my previous report, dated 20 July 2001 (S/2001/714).

II. Situation in the area of operation

2. The situation continued to be generally stable throughout most of the UNIFIL area of operation, with the exception of ongoing tensions and breaches of the Blue Line in the Shab'a farms area (see para. 4 below). During the reporting period, there was a comparative decrease in the number of ground violations of the line, with those from the Lebanese side primarily attributable to crossings by shepherds, picnickers and occasional vehicles, and with only one recorded from the Israeli side.

3. Israeli air violations of the Blue Line, however, continued on an almost daily basis, penetrating deep into Lebanese airspace. These incursions are not justified and cause great concern to the civilian population, particularly low-altitude flights that break the sound barrier over populated areas. The air violations are ongoing, although démarches to the Israeli authorities, calling on them to cease the overflights and to fully respect the Blue Line, have been made repeatedly by me, other senior United Nations officials and a number of interested Governments. As from 11 October, my Personal Representative for southern Lebanon, Staffan de Mistura, began issuing public statements to the same effect on the occurrence of each air violation. He has also made it clear that no violations of the Blue Line can be accepted by the United Nations, and that no violation can justify another.

4. Two serious breaches of the ceasefire occurred in the Shab'a farms area. On 3 October, Hizbollah fired 18 missiles and 33 mortar rounds at two positions of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) on the line south-east of Kafr Shuba. On 22 October, Hizbollah fired 10 missiles and 61 mortar rounds at five IDF positions in the same vicinity. In both instances, IDF responded with heavy artillery and mortar fire to the Lebanese side of the line in the same vicinity, in the latter case also dropping two air-to-ground missiles. There were no casualties from either incident.

5. Demonstrators on the Lebanese side gathered periodically at the points of friction identified in my previous reports, Sheikh Abbad Hill east of Hula and Fatima gate west of Metulla, to throw stones and other objects at Israeli personnel across the line. The trend, noted in my previous report, of fewer incidents and generally smaller crowds continued. There was one incident on 17 December in which a Lebanese demonstrator who threw firecrackers to the Israeli side of Sheikh Abbad Hill was shot and wounded in the leg by an Israeli soldier.

6. Local administration in the south was further strengthened during the reporting period, linked in

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large part to the successful municipal elections held in southern Lebanon in early September, which were marked by high voter turnout. Communications, health and welfare systems, and postal services made further slow progress towards integration with the rest of the country. The 1,000-strong contingent of the Lebanese Joint Security Force, comprising army and internal security forces, continued to operate in the areas vacated by Israel and increased their activity near the Blue Line, intervening on several occasions to avert potential threats to peace and security.

7. The Government of Lebanon continued to maintain the position that, so long as there was no comprehensive peace with Israel, the Lebanese armed forces would not be deployed along the Blue Line. In this vacuum, Hizbollah increased its visible presence near the line through its network of mobile and fixed positions. In August, Hizbollah established a presence adjacent to Ghajar, a village straddling the Blue Line with two thirds on the Lebanese side and one third on the Israeli side. Confrontation in this area has thus far been avoided owing to the restraint shown by both sides. Hizbollah also continued to extend social, medical and educational services to the local population in areas near the Blue Line.

8. On several occasions, Hizbollah personnel interfered with the freedom of movement of UNIFIL. Although freedom of movement was re-established after UNIFIL brought specific restrictions to the attention of the Lebanese authorities, the restrictions are recurrent.

9. The focus of UNIFIL operations remained on the Blue Line and the adjacent area, where UNIFIL continued its efforts to maintain the ceasefire through patrols, observation from fixed positions and close contact with the parties, the latter with a view to correcting violations, resolving incidents and preventing escalation.

10 UNIFIL continued to assist the civilian population in the form of medical care, water projects, equipment or services for schools and orphanages and supplies of social services to the needy. This assistance was provided from resources made available by troop-contributing countries. UNIFIL medical centres and mobile teams provided medical care to an average of 5,000 civilian patients per month. A field dental programme treated approximately 200 cases per month. Veterinary assistance was provided to some villages within the UNIFIL area of operation. UNIFIL cooperated closely on humanitarian matters with the Lebanese authorities, United Nations agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other organizations and agencies operating in Lebanon.

11. The United Nations continued to facilitate international assistance to the Government of Lebanon for mine action in southern Lebanon under the close supervision of my Personal Representative and in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). A memorandum of understanding was concluded between the United Arab Emirates and Lebanon, and an International Support Group for Mine Action was created, bringing together 22 countries involved in mine action in Lebanon. The regional mine action coordination cell, established by the United Nations Mine Action Service in Tyre, was expanded to enhance its capability for operational coordination, quality assurance and information management for United Nations mine action in Lebanon.

12. Concern over the number of mines and unexploded ordnance in southern Lebanon took on a new dimension when in December, IDF turned over to UNIFIL a substantial amount of information on the presence of additional minefields in the area, most within a short distance of the Blue Line.

13. A number of civilian casualties due to mine incidents have been recorded. Since July, 2 civilians have died and 10 were injured as a result of exploding mines and ordnance. During the reporting period, UNIFIL demolished more than 368 mines and rounds of unexploded ordnance.

14. Progress has been achieved in discussions between the United Nations and Israel on issues connected to the UNIFIL videotapes of events related to the abduction by Hizbollah of three Israeli soldiers on 7 October 2000 (see S/2001/714, para. 10).

15. My Personal Representative worked in close collaboration with UNDP and the World Bank to facilitate the funding and implementation of development projects in the south by privately and publicly advocating the needs of the area. UNDP continued to lead the efforts of the United Nations system in working with the Lebanese authorities for the development and rehabilitation of the south.

III. Organizational matters

16. The reconfiguration and redeployment of UNIFIL proceeded as set out in my report of 30 April last year (S/2001/423). Following the repatriation of the Nepalese battalion and the Polish engineering company at the end of July, the Finnish and Irish battalions were repatriated in October and November respectively. UNIFIL closed a number of rear positions and moved troops into closer proximity to the Blue Line. A map showing the current deployment of UNIFIL is attached.

17. As a result of the above changes, as at 31 December, UNIFIL comprised 3,494 troops, from Fiji (458), France (233), Ghana (811), India (819), Italy (52), Poland (483) and Ukraine (638). UNIFIL was assisted in its tasks by 51 military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). In addition, UNIFIL employed 448 civilian staff, of whom 135 were recruited internationally and 313 locally.

18. Major General Lalit Mohan Tewari was appointed as Force Commander and took up his duties on 19 August 2001. Mr. de Mistura continued to act as my Personal Representative in Beirut.

19. I regret to report the death of a Ghanaian member of the Force due to natural causes. Since the establishment of UNIFIL, 239 members of the Force have lost their lives: 78 as a result of firings or bomb explosions, 101 as a result of accidents and 60 from other causes. Firing or mine explosions wounded a total of 344.

IV. Financial aspects

20. By its resolutions 55/180 B of 14 June 2001 and 56/214 of 21 December 2001, the General Assembly appropriated the amount of $143 million gross, equivalent to a monthly rate of $11.9 million gross, for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNIFIL beyond 31 January 2002, as recommended in paragraph 29 below, the cost of its maintenance would be limited to the monthly rate approved by the General Assembly.

21. As at 15 December 2001, unpaid assessments to the special account for UNIFIL for the period since its inception to 31 December 2001 amounted to $166.5 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $1,979.1 million.

V. Observations

22. The UNIFIL area of operation has been generally calm, with low incident and tension levels recorded since my previous report. The focus of UNIFIL operations remained on the Blue Line and the adjacent area, with UNIFIL working with the parties to avert or correct violations and to defuse tensions.

23. The serious breaches of the ceasefire in the Shab'a farms area remained a significant cause of concern. It appears that over the past several months, both parties have exercised greater restraint in this regard. I would hope that this is indicative of a renewed commitment on both sides to fully honour their obligation to respect the Blue Line. The ongoing Israeli incursions into sovereign Lebanese airspace nevertheless remain a troubling counter-indication. I once again emphasize the critical need for all parties concerned to respect the Blue Line, as repeatedly called for by the Security Council, to cease all violations thereof and to refrain from any action that could serve to destabilize the situation.

24. The Government of Lebanon continued to take additional steps to restore its effective authority throughout the south, but this was limited to strengthening the presence of security forces and supporting the local administration, and did not include additional deployment of the Lebanese army. The Government of Lebanon has continued to let Hizbollah operate close to the Blue Line. More steps can be taken to extend the Government's authority to all of southern Lebanon, as called for by the Council most recently in its resolution 1365 (2001). The Government should make a more concerted effort to take full responsibility for the provision of basic services to the population and for the deployment of the army.

25. In my report of 22 January 2001 (S/2001/66), I noted that UNIFIL, having essentially completed two of the three parts of its mandate, had effectively assumed the functions of an observer mission. I noted, however, that in view of the conditions in the region, the tasks of UNIFIL should be carried out by a combination of armed infantry and unarmed observers. I recommended, therefore, a phased reconfiguration of the Force to a strength of close to 2,000 all ranks,

supported by the unarmed military observers of UNTSO, the strength of the latter to remain unaltered.

26. Taking into account the Security Council's request in paragraphs 3 and 14 of its resolution 1365 (2001), I recommend that the reconfiguration proceed as set forth in paragraph 10 of my report of 30 April 2001 (S/2001/423). The situation on the ground continues to support a prudent approach. Taken together with the need to harmonize the reconfiguration with the normal troop rotation schedule, this will require that the further reductions needed to complete the reconfiguration commence in June of this year. The bulk of the reduction would be achieved by the non-replacement of the Fijian contingent and the decrease of the Ukrainian battalion to less than half of its current strength, retaining its demining component. The Force would thus be stabilized at a strength of close to 2,000 all ranks by the end of 2002.

27. Observer Group Lebanon is moving towards a more mobile concept; however, in view of the conditions on the ground and the longer-term role of UNTSO in the region, the Group will maintain patrol bases, where the observers will be accommodated. Security for those bases will be provided largely by UNIFIL, thus freeing more observers for their patrolling, investigative and liaison functions.

28. A reconfigured UNIFIL will continue to contribute towards stability in southern Lebanon by monitoring and observing along the Blue Line. At the same time, given the tensions in the region, there is an ongoing need for United Nations political and diplomatic support for the parties to establish lasting peace and security. Accordingly, my Personal Representative will pursue actively his current efforts, in close consultation with Terje Roed-Larsen, my Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process.

29. In a letter dated 9 January 2002 (S/2002/40), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations conveyed to me his Government's request that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of six months. In the light of conditions prevailing in the area, the Security Council may wish to decide to extend the mandate until 31 July 2002, in line with paragraph 26 above.

30. I must again draw attention to the serious shortfall in the funding of the Force. At present, unpaid assessments amount to $166.5 million. This represents money owed to the Member States that contribute the troops that make up the Force. I appeal to all Member States to pay their assessments promptly and in full and to clear all remaining arrears. I should like to express my gratitude to the Governments contributing troops to the Force for their understanding and patience.

31. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to Mr. de Mistura, my Personal Representative, and to pay tribute to the men and women of UNIFIL and Major General Tewari for the manner in which they have carried out their tasks. Their discipline and bearing have been of a high order, reflecting credit on themselves and the United Nations.



Map No. 4144 Rev. 4 UNITED NATIONS
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Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section

United Nations S/2002/56

Security Council

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Note by the President of the Security Council

1. The members of the Security Council, recalling the statement by the President of the Security Council on 31 January 2001 (S/PRST/2001/3) and relevant Security Council resolutions about peacekeeping, having considered the views expressed, including in the letters of a number of troop-contributing countries of 30 May 2001 (S/2001/535) and 22 June 2001 (S/2001/626), and recognizing the desirability of forging a more effective partnership with troop-contributing countries, including by establishing a new mechanism for cooperation pursuant to section D, paragraph 1, of annex I to Security Council resolution 1353 (2001) of 13 June 2001, in addition to the current forms of consultation between the Council, the troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat, have given their agreement to the principle of convening joint meetings of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations and troop-contributing countries as an additional mechanism for strengthening cooperation with troop-contributing countries on specific peacekeeping operations.

2. The purpose of the joint meetings of the Working Group and troop-contributing countries is to enable the members of the Council, relevant troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat to engage in a closer and more interactive dialogue over issues pertaining to peacekeeping operations as outlined in paragraphs 2 and 4 of section B of annex II to resolution 1353 (2001) so as to complement effectively the ongoing process of consultation meetings pursuant to the above-mentioned resolution. At the joint meetings, specific aspects of peacekeeping operations will be discussed in order to facilitate the work of the Security Council and the Secretariat by taking into account the views of the troop-contributing countries in relation to a corresponding peacekeeping operation.

3. The joint meetings of the Working Group and troop-contributing countries will be composed of the members of the Security Council and relevant troop-contributing countries as identified by the Secretariat, in consultations with the Chairman of the Working Group, in particular those contributing at least one formed military unit or a comparable number of civilian police, as well as representatives of the Secretariat. In specific circumstances, when the agenda of those meetings exceeds the limits of the strict interest of the troop-contributing countries on the ground, the Working Group may invite other significant actors to attend the joint meetings when the Working Group deems their participation to bring added value to the discussion at hand. The Secretariat is encouraged to provide military, political, humanitarian and other briefings and advice as appropriate.

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4. The Chairman of the Working Group, bearing in mind that the workload of the Security Council should not become unduly burdensome, in consultation with members of the Working Group, relevant troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat, will be responsible for convening the joint meetings of the Working Group and troop-contributing countries. Depending on the situation in specific peacekeeping operations, meetings will be held as often as necessary and practicable. In the case of new peacekeeping missions, joint meetings may be convened at an early stage in order to consult prospective troop-contributing countries during the mission planning process.

5. The joint meetings of the Working Group and troop-contributing countries will be chaired by the Chairman of the Security Council Working Group or an alternate Security Council member. The Chairman will invite members of the Working Group and the troop-contributing countries to participate, indicating the level he or she deems appropriate for specific meetings. As a general rule, the venue and time of such meetings will be published in the Journal of the United Nations. The procedures adopted for the joint meetings should be kept as flexible as possible to allow for interactive discussion by the participants.

6. The Chairman of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations will be responsible for reporting to the Security Council on the joint meetings. Such communication can take various forms, including oral briefings. The Secretariat will be requested to provide the necessary assistance in this regard and in other relevant areas.

7. The Security Council continues to commit itself to the implementation of resolution 1353 (2001). The existing formats of meetings with troop-contributing countries should be continued and improved according to the provisions contained in that resolution. Such meetings and the joint meetings of the Working Group and troop-contributing countries should be mutually complementary.

8. The new cooperation mechanism of the joint meetings of the Working Group and troop-contributing countries should not prejudice the responsibilities of the Security Council and its members as set out in the Charter and should not interfere in the operational responsibilities of the Secretariat for peacekeeping operations.

United Nations A/56/772–S/2002/57

General Assembly
Security Council

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15 January 2002

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General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Agenda item 166
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Fifty-seventh year

Letter dated 11 January 2002 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the recent irresponsible and reckless misinformation ploy by Israel, also referred to in the letter contained in document A/56/766-S/2002/25, with regard to the reported seizure of a ship in the Red Sea allegedly carrying arms. Contrary to the totally baseless and purely unfounded allegations levelled by the Israelis against my country, I wish to inform you that my Government has strongly denied any knowledge of or connection with the seized ship. New information from highly reliable international sources concerning the ownership of the vessel has totally discredited the Israeli campaign of defamation and fabrication against my country.

It is astonishing that Israel, immediately after the seizure of the ship and prior to any investigations, claimed knowledge of every detail, including its origin and destination, whereas other informed countries continue to express doubts about the situation surrounding the ship. The fact that they turned a blind eye to the proposal put forward by the Palestinians to form a multipartite investigating commission to look into the incident speaks for itself and clearly points to a well planned script in place. No doubt that well prepared jailhouse interviews with the crew of the ship will never bring any credibility to the scheme.

It is evident that through a massive disinformation campaign, including the dispatch of Israeli intelligence operatives to various capitals, Israel aims at exacerbating the tension in the region in a futile attempt to cover up its campaign of aggression and State terrorism against the Palestinian people and undermines the support of international public opinion for the Palestinians. We warn that further plots to advance such schemes should be impending.

The international community should once and for all put an end to the Israeli game of deceit, defamation and forgery. Israel is armed to the teeth with the state-of-the-art weapons and it constantly continues its military build-up. It is a matter of public record that Israel has unlawfully acquired nuclear capability and possesses other weapons of mass destruction, thereby endangering the entire region.

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The Islamic Republic of Iran once again and categorically rejects the Israeli allegations contained in the above-mentioned letter and expects the United Nations to hold Israel accountable for such forgeries aimed at exacerbating regional tension as well as the expansionist and militaristic policies that such misinformation campaigns intend to serve and justify.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 166, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Hadi **Nejad-Hosseinian**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/ES-10/139–S/2002/58

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Fifty-seventh year

Identical letters dated 14 January 2002 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Today, Monday 14 January 2002, Israel, the occupying Power, committed yet another extrajudicial execution, killing Mr. Raed El-Karmi in the city of Tulkarem in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Mr. El-Karmi was killed by a bomb planted near his home and detonated as he was passing by.

Also today, Israeli police demolished nine Palestinian homes in the neighbourhood of Al-Eisaweyah in Occupied East Jerusalem. The demolitions took place in spite of the uproar over the Israeli demolition of more than 54 homes in the Rafah refugee camp in Gaza on Friday, 11 January 2002, that left over 600 people homeless. In this regard, Israeli officials continued with their usual pattern of lying. The spokesmen for the army and the Prime Minister, as well as the Minister of Defence and the Prime Minister himself, partook in falsifying the facts by minimizing the number of houses destroyed, asserting that they were uninhabited, and finally also claiming that the houses hid smuggling tunnels. Furthermore, Mr. Sharon tried to use this horrible action to suggest the establishment of a buffer zone between Gaza and Egypt.

During the last two to three days, Israeli occupying forces shelled and destroyed several small vessels belonging to the Palestinian naval police while they were docked in a small harbour in Gaza City. Also, the Israeli occupying forces sent their tanks and bulldozers again to Gaza International Airport to ensure a huge amount of destruction of the airport.

All of the above-mentioned Israeli war crimes, State terrorism and other atrocities affirm once more that Mr. Ariel Sharon and his Government want only to pursue the military confrontation and to destroy any chances for real peace in the region. It is also highly regrettable that all of this is taking place without the necessary reaction by the international community and, even worse, with what could be considered as encouragement by some quarters. This must end, and the

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occupying Power must be held accountable before the Middle East region loses all hope.

In follow-up to my previous 89 letters to you regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, dated from 29 September 2000 to 11 January 2002 (A/55/432-S/2000/921; A/55/437-S/2000/930; A/55/450-S/2000/957; A/55/466-S/2000/971; A/55/474-S/2000/984; A/55/490-S/2000/993; A/ES-10/39-S/2000/1015; A/ES-10/40-S/2000/1025; A/ES-10/42-S/2000/1068; A/ES-10/43-S/2000/1078; A/ES-10/44-S/2000/1093; A/ES-10/45-S/2000/1104; A/ES-10/46-S/2000/1107; A/ES-10/47-S/2000/1116; A/ES-10/48-S/2000/1129; A/ES-10/49-S/2000/1154; A/ES-10/50-S/2000/1173; A/ES-10/51-S/2000/1185; A/ES-10/52-S/2000/1206; A/ES-10/53-S/2000/1247; A/ES-10/54-S/2001/7; A/ES-10/55-S/2001/33; A/ES-10/56-S/2001/50; A/ES-10/57-S/2001/101; A/ES-10/58-S/2001/131; A/ES-10/59-S/2001/156; A/ES-10/60-S/2001/175; A/ES-10/61-S/2001/189; A/ES-10/64-S/2001/209; A/ES-10/65-S/2001/226; A/ES-10/66-S/2001/239; A/ES-10/67-S/2001/255; A/ES-10/68-S/2001/284; A/ES-10/69-S/2001/295; A/ES-10/70-S/2001/304; A/ES-10/71-S/2001/314; A/ES-10/72-S/2001/332; A/ES-10/75-S/2001/352; A/ES-10/76-S/2001/372; A/ES-10/79-S/2001/418; A/ES-10/80-S/2001/432; A/ES-10/81-S/2001/447; A/ES-10/82-S/2001/463; A/ES-10/83-S/2001/471; A/ES-10/84-S/2001/479; A/ES-10/85-S/2001/486; A/ES-10/86-S/2001/496; A/ES-10/87-S/2001/504; A/ES-10/88-S/2001/508; A/ES-10/89-S/2001/544; A/ES-10/90-S/2001/586; A/ES-10/91-S/2001/605; A/ES-10/92-S/2001/629; A/ES-10/93-S/2001/657; A/ES-10/94-S/2001/669; A/ES-10/95-S/2001/686; A/ES-10/96-S/2001/697; A/ES-10/97-S/2001/708; A/ES-10/98-S/2001/717; A/ES-10/99-S/2001/742; A/ES-10/100-S/2001/754; A/ES-10/101-S/2001/783; A/ES-10/102-S/2001/785; A/ES-10/103-S/2001/798; A/ES-10/104-S/2001/812; A/ES-10/105-S/2001/814; A/ES-10/107-S/2001/821; A/ES-10/108-S/2001/826; A/ES-10/111-S/2001/880; A/ES-10/112-S/2001/918; A/ES-10/114-S/2001/928; A/ES-10/115-S/2001/932; A/ES-10/116-S/2001/941; A/ES-10/117-S/2001/971; A/ES-10/118-S/2001/989; A/ES-10/119-S/2001/991; A/ES-10/121-S/2001/1007; A/ES-10/122-S/2001/1024; A/ES-10/123-S/2001/1036; A/ES-10/124-S/2001/1084; A/ES-10/125-S/2001/1092; A/ES-10/126-S/2001/1118; A/ES-10/128-S/2001/1149; A/ES-10/129-S/2001/1166; A/ES-10/133-S/2001/1239; A/ES-10/134-S/2001/1261; A/ES-10/136-S/2002/18; A/ES-10/137-S/2002/39 and A/ES-10/138-S/2002/48), I regret to inform you that the killing of Mr. Raed Karmi raises the total number of Palestinians killed since 28 September 2000 to 845 martyrs.

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Dr. Nasser **Al-Kidwa**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

United Nations S/2002/59

Security Council

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14 January 2002

Original: English

Letter dated 11 January 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the pleasure to inform you that pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 1386 (2001), the Government of Turkey has approved a decision authorizing the participation of 261 military personnel in the International Security Assistance Force deployed in Afghanistan under the leadership of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In addition, six Turkish officers will be based at the headquarters of the said Force.

A team will soon travel to Afghanistan to make the necessary preparations for the deployment of the Turkish contingent.

I would appreciate it if the present letter could be circulated as a Security Council document.

(*Signed*) Ümit **Pamir**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

02-21210 (E) 140102

United Nations S/2002/60

Security Council

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English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 13 January 2002 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I should like to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 11 January 2002 from Mr. Naji Sabri, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, clarifying the position of Iraq on the contents of the letter dated 12 December 2001 from Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber, Deputy Prime Minister and Minster for Foreign Affairs of the State of Kuwait, which is contained in document S/2001/1188.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Abdul Munim **Al-Kadhe**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex to the letter dated 13 January 2002 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I should like to refer to the letter dated 12 January 2002 from Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Kuwait (S/2001/1188) on the subject of missing persons and wish to clarify the position of Iraq on its contents, as follows:

1. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Kuwait criticizes what he calls Iraq's advancing of "proposals for the establishment of committees and so forth outside the framework of the United Nations" to resolve the missing persons issue. We had hoped that the State of Kuwait would welcome these initiatives on the part of Iraq as affirming Iraq's seriousness and sincere desire to achieve progress on this humanitarian issue, rather than the contrary. It should be mentioned that Iraq, in addition to its initiatives, has responded to mediation efforts by the League of Arab States (September 1991 and January 1993), the chairmanship of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (1994), the Government of the State of Qatar (February 1993), His Majesty the King of Morocco (October 1993), His Excellency the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Boris Yeltsin (September 1994) and the Government of the Italian Republic (July 2001). All of these mediation efforts were made at the request of the State of Kuwait, and it is not comprehensible that the State of Kuwait should seek the mediation of regional organizations and States but that when Iraq responds to them it should withdraw and criticize this response.

2. The letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Kuwait mentions the existence of four mechanisms to which "Iraq can resort ... at any time for this purpose". This characterization seeks to give the impression that Iraq has so far not cooperated and erases the record of Iraq's cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) since 1991 and the continuation of this cooperation up to the present time, which has yielded some important results regarding discovery of the fate of many of the missing persons. The most recent example of that is that Iraq's cooperation made it possible to close the file of the Saudi pilot Mahmud Nazirah on 31 August 2001. With regard to the last-mentioned of these four mechanisms listed in the letter of the Kuwaiti Minister for Foreign Affairs, pertaining to the function of the so-called "high-level Coordinator", Iraq reaffirms that this function transfers the issue of missing persons from its natural place within the purview of ICRC and turns it into a political issue administered by the Security Council. It is therefore contrary to the principles of international humanitarian law, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the rules of operation of ICRC. It is also discriminatory and biased, and its scope is limited to the issue of missing persons who are Kuwaitis and third-country nationals, while it refuses to investigate the subject of Iraqi missing persons, whose number is double that of the missing persons who are Kuwaitis and third-country nationals. That is contrary to all humanitarian standards.

3. The Kuwaiti Minister says that the State of Kuwait is ready to permit ICRC to conduct a free and thorough search in Kuwaiti territory for the missing Iraqis whose presence is alleged by the Iraqi Government, on the understanding that it obtains in return "a clear undertaking from the Iraqi Government that it will provide Kuwait with full and precise information on the fate of the Kuwaitis".

This Kuwaiti proposal deals with a single issue using two standards. It asks one thing of Iraq and gives an undertaking that the State of Kuwait will do something else that is completely different. Iraq is ready to cooperate with Kuwait to agree on non-discriminatory steps under ICRC supervision to resolve the missing persons issue, regardless of their nationalities. The Government of Iraq wishes to affirm its serious and sincere desire for direct and sincere cooperation with the State of Kuwait, under ICRC supervision, as the best way of resolving this humanitarian issue.

The missing persons file calls for serious effort and cooperation by all parties where missing persons are located, under ICRC supervision. There exists experience in this area that may be emulated. What Iraq and Iran are doing in this humanitarian field, under ICRC supervision, affords an example of what may be achieved between the parties concerned without the intervention of outside parties that seek only to politicize the humanitarian issue, use it for specific political ends and prolong the state of tension between these parties.

(*Signed*) Naji **Sabri**
Minister for Foreign Affairs

United Nations S/2002/61

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Identical letters dated 14 January 2002 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the Turkish armed forces have embarked on a new series of wide-ranging military operations against Iraqi territory, as follows:

1. On 21 and 22 December 2001, a Turkish military force of some 400 troops with 50 military vehicles and 30 tanks loaded on transporters entered northern Iraq in the Zakho area by way of the Ibrahim al-Khalil gate.

2. On 28 December 2001, 10 civilian buses and 12 military vehicles carrying some 800 Turkish special forces troops entered by way of the same gate. Part of the force, which had come from its headquarters base in Turkey's Kayseri province, took up positions in the Baykufah sector and the remainder in the Diyana area.

This new Turkish incursion into Iraq's northern territories is part of a series of hostile operations and of the flagrant violations being committed by Turkish armed forces against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq. These actions confirm the duplicitous policy being pursued by Turkey with regard to the anomalous situation in northern Iraq that it helped to create and perpetuate in an act of blatant interference in the internal affairs of Iraq. Turkey's claim that it is in pursuit of elements that pose a threat to its national security cannot legitimize its assaults on Iraq's sovereignty, and the correct way to safeguard the security of Turkey's southern borders is for it to respect Iraq's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity and to desist from facilitating foreign interference in Iraq's internal affairs and encroachments on its sovereignty and territory.

The Government of the Republic of Iraq condemns and deplores in the strongest terms the constant violation of Iraq's territory and airspace in the north by Turkish armed forces in breach of the principles of good-neighbourliness and the norms embodied in international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

We call upon Turkey to desist forthwith from these hostile practices and to withdraw its invading forces from Iraqi territory. We affirm that the Government of Iraq reserves in full its legitimate right to defend itself, and we consider that Turkey bears full responsibility under international law for the consequences of its ongoing

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aggression, its violations of Iraq's sovereignty, territorial integrity and airspace and its exposure of Iraq's security and safety to grave risks.

We hope that the United Nations will fulfil its responsibilities and that it will urge the Turkish Government to comply with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international law by ceasing forthwith its military aggression and its blatant interference in Iraq's internal affairs and by immediately withdrawing its armed forces from Iraq's territory.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Abdul Munim **Al-Kadhe**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations S/2002/62

Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999, by which the Council decided to establish the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). In paragraph 20 of that resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report at regular intervals on the implementation of the mandate of the Mission. The current report covers the activities of UNMIK and developments in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, since the report of 2 October 2001 (S/2001/926). Matters reported in the Security Council's meetings on 5 October and 27 November 2001 are referred to as necessary (see S/PV.4387 and S/PV.4430).

2. The three months covered by the present report were dominated by the election of a legislature and the subsequent efforts to forge a governing majority. Those efforts are still ongoing. At the same time, UNMIK made internal adjustments for the handover of significant powers to the provisional institutions of self-government and ensured that the incoming administration will have a fully funded budget. The security situation was generally calm.

II. Establishing the provisional institutions of self-government

A. Legislature

3. The election of the Kosovo Assembly on 17 November 2001 was generally considered a great success. It was organized by UNMIK's Pillar III (institution-building), which is led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Notwithstanding some instances of intimidation in northern Kosovo by groups opposed to Kosovo Serb participation, the campaign and the voting itself were orderly and generally free of violence (see S/PV.4430). The ballot was conducted with the extensive involvement of domestic observers as well as joint observation teams from Kosovo Albanian and Serbian non-governmental organizations. The results of the election, and the distribution of seats in the Assembly are shown in annex IV to the present report.

4. No party gained enough seats in the Assembly to govern alone, and attention is now focused on the need to form a coalition. The main efforts concentrated on a

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power-sharing arrangement between the three main Kosovo Albanian parties. On 7 December, UNMIK arranged a meeting between Dr. Rugova, of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), and Mr. Thaci, of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), on United Nations premises. Representatives of foreign Governments have also hosted meetings with the main party representatives in the Assembly. It should be noted that the minority parties also have an important role to play; they have 35 of the 120 seats in the Assembly and, in accordance with the Constitutional Framework, will provide at least two Ministers.

5. On 10 December, the Assembly held its inaugural session. At that session, both the seven-member presidency of the Assembly as well as the President of Kosovo were to be elected; the latter would then nominate a Prime Minister for endorsement by the Assembly. However, the PDK did not submit candidates for the two seats of the presidency reserved for it, and the Assembly elected only its President, Mr. Nexhet Daci of the LDK and four other members; one from the LDK, two from the (Kosovo Serb) Return Coalition, and one from the United Roma Party. The meeting was then adjourned.

6. On 13 December, the Assembly met again to elect the President of Kosovo. The only candidate was Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the LDK. He received 49 votes, including 46 from the members of his party who were present, but fell well short of the 80 votes required. On 10 January 2002, the Assembly held its second and third ballots for the election of the President. Dr. Rugova was again the only candidate. In the second round, he received 50 votes as compared to 80 that were required. In the third round, a simple majority of 61 votes was required for election; Dr. Rugova received 51.

7. UNMIK created a special task force to establish the administrative and other services necessary to support the Assembly. Experts provided by France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the Council of Europe were critical in setting up the Assembly's secretariat and developing its provisional rules of procedure. International staff will continue to fill key posts while local staff are being recruited and trained. So far, 57 local staff have been hired, of whom 10 are members of minorities. In cooperation with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (Washington, D.C.), UNMIK's Pillar III arranged a week-long seminar on the roles and responsibilities of legislators, in which the vast majority of the Assembly members participated.

8. The security of minority Assembly members and staff remains a matter of great concern. The first two meetings of the Assembly were held without incident under stringent security measures, with close protection and escort officers assigned to each Kosovo Serb member. The Assembly building is currently guarded by teams of specially trained officers of the Kosovo Police Service, working alongside international colleagues.

9. Pending the establishment of the provisional institutions of self-government, mechanisms are in place to ensure that there is no legislative vacuum. In order to maintain regular contact with Kosovo's major political leaders and to consult them on legislation pertaining to his reserved powers of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the Interim Administrative Council has continued to function and will do so until the date of the transfer of authority and the establishment of appropriate consultative mechanisms between UNMIK and the provisional institutions of self-government.

B. Executive

10. Once the provisional institutions of self-government are in place, the transfer of authority will result in a change of structure and emphasis in UNMIK's work, as it hands over direct control of the transferred areas while retaining competencies reserved to the Special Representative. In order to prepare for the division of authority between transferred and reserved competencies, intensive efforts were made to restructure the Mission and transform the former Joint Interim Administrative Structures. UNMIK has already moved out of the Government Building to make room for the Assembly and other organs of the provisional institutions of self-government.

11. The 20 administrative departments that existed before have been consolidated into nine Transitional Departments, which will become Ministries as soon as the Government is established. Pillar II (civil administration) will look after seven: Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development; Culture, Youth and Sports; Education, Science and Technology; Labour and Social Welfare; Health, Environment and Spatial Planning; Transport and Communications; and Public Services. Pillar IV (economic reconstruction and development), led by the European Union, will look after two: Trade and Industry, and Finance and Economy.

12. In each Ministry, a Principal International Officer will advise the Minister on policy development and governance, coordinate the international staff within the Ministry and serve as senior liaison to UNMIK. At present, the Principal International Officer is Officer-in-Charge, pending the appointment of Ministers. To ensure a smooth and efficient transition, UNMIK international staff will continue to perform line functions for a limited time after the Government has been established. In this capacity, they will be placed under the Minister. They will hand over their executive functions as soon as possible to local civil servants and gradually limit their involvement to providing advice and to matters of minority integration and protection and liaison with United Nations specialized agencies and other donors.

13. At the municipal level, the UNMIK administrators are progressively handing over to the local authorities, with a view to disengaging fully in the future. Responsibility for budgetary and financial administration is also being handed over to the municipalities. To facilitate this, a uniform financial management system for the municipalities has been agreed upon with the Central Fiscal Authority, and training of the municipal civil service has commenced. There has been some progress with the inclusion of non-Kosovo Albanian communities in the local government. Approximately 90 Kosovo Serbs now participate in the work of 13 municipal assemblies, and representatives of other non-majority communities participate in the assemblies of their respective municipalities. The municipal elections that must take place before the current two-year mandate expires in October will provide municipal leaders with a new political mandate for the exercise of their expanded responsibilities.

14. The functions of UNMIK's regional administrations have been redefined. They will cover security coordination; general oversight over UNMIK staff in the regions and municipalities; reporting and auditing; political assessments; and coordination of the return of displaced persons. During the transition period, the Regional Administrators will maintain political oversight regarding the implementation of UNMIK regulations 2001/9 on the Constitutional Framework, 2001/19 on the

Executive Branch of the provisional institutions of self-government, and 2000/45 on the self-government of municipalities.

C. Reserved powers

15. In accordance with the Constitutional Framework, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General will retain certain reserved powers. In order to discharge these, the following UNMIK Directorates have been established: Civil Protection, which has taken over the responsibilities of the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre, following the successful completion of its operations in mid-December 2001; Administrative Affairs; Infrastructure Affairs; and Rural Affairs. The Special Representative will also retain responsibility for the Kosovo Protection Corps, together with the international security presence (KFOR) (an agreement has been reached with the Corps leadership that the number of active members will be reduced from approximately 4,300 to 3,000 by the end of the year). Additional reserved powers are the administration and financing of civil security and emergency preparedness; mine clearance; the administration of public, state and socially owned property; the regulation of public and socially owned enterprises; the administration of railways, allocation of radio frequencies, and civil aviation; the civil registry database; the registration of habitual residents; the Housing and Property Directorate, including the Housing Claims Commission; control over cross-border/boundary transit of goods; general powers, such as international relations, in a number of areas; and the judiciary and the police (except for court administration, which will be transferred to the Ministry of Public Services); and several economic areas, such as the Central Fiscal Authority, which will work alongside the new Ministry of Finance and Economy, but will continue to be responsible for fiscal and financial issues not yet transferred to the new Government.

III. Ensuring minority participation

16. An important concern in preparing the Assembly election was to ensure the participation of the minority communities, especially of the Serbian community, which had boycotted the municipal election in 1999 and whose participation in the ballot remained open until the last minute. While the Kosovo Serbs generally recognized that participation in the new political institutions was the key to having a say in Kosovo's future, they felt that the conditions for effective participation did not exist and were not confident that they could be created. On 25 October, Mr. Haekkerup, the Special Representative, met with President Kostunica in Belgrade. It was agreed to draw up a joint paper that would address these issues. After several drafts and intensive negotiations, in which both the Secretary-General and President Kostunica intervened, agreement was reached on a Common Document, which was signed in Belgrade on 5 November by Mr. Haekkerup and Dr. Covic, Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia in his capacity as the Special Representative of President Kostunica to Kosovo. The document had two main purposes: first, to provide the Yugoslav authorities with an authoritative list of measures that UNMIK had already taken, or was taking, to assist the Kosovo Serb community, so as to make it easier to encourage Kosovo Serb participation in the election; and, secondly, to provide a solid basis for a cooperative relationship with the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Common Document reiterates the basic principles of Security

Council resolution 1244 (1999) and outlines in detail a number of areas of mutual interest and common concern: enhanced security and freedom of movement; swift progress on returns, missing persons and Kosovo Albanian detainees in Serbia proper; integration of Kosovo Serbs into the provisional institutions of self-government; establishment of a multi-ethnic and unbiased justice system; further development of the Kosovo Police Service; increased efforts on property rights issues; cross-border/boundary police cooperation. Following the signing of the Common Document, the Kosovo Serb Return Coalition decided to participate in the election and submitted its list of candidates.

17. A key provision of the Common Document is the establishment of a High-ranking Working Group as the official forum for dialogue and cooperation between UNMIK and the provisional institutions of self-government on the one hand, and the Yugoslav authorities on the other. Although the initial reactions of the Kosovo Albanian leaders were critical, it is hoped that the Working Group will in time contribute to a process of normalization and promote direct dialogue between the democratically elected leaders in Pristina and Belgrade.

IV. Returns

18. One of the most important concerns of the Kosovo Serb community and a key objective of UNMIK is the creation of conditions for the sustainable return of internally displaced persons and refugees. Following the signing of the Common Document, the Special Representative established within his own office the Office of Returns and Communities, to coordinate UNMIK's work on community issues, maintain close links with all key stakeholders, including the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia, and the donor community, and provide strategic advice to the Special Representative on ways to advance the return and reintegration of displaced persons. Work has begun on a framework for 2002/2003, which will combine economic incentives and other measures in order to offer longer-term prospects to returnees and internally displaced persons.

19. These efforts are being undertaken against the background of a slowdown of Kosovo Serb returns during the last year. According to figures provided by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a total of 2,432 Serbs, out of the 229,900 registered internally displaced persons, returned to Kosovo by 8 December 2001. Two thirds of these returns took place during 2000, while less than 1,000 returned in 2001, not all of whom remained permanently. Two projects of organized returns have resulted over the past four months in the return of about 150 Kosovo Serbs to their original communities in Kosovo. The majority of these returnees have gone back to the Osojane valley (Pec region), where the first phase of an integrated programme to ensure the sustainability of the returns was completed in December. This entailed the rebuilding of 55 houses, the construction of a clinic and a large school, capable of providing instruction to children from the entire valley, and the restoration of public utilities, such as electric power and a bus service. A second phase, comprising a further 50 houses, income generation projects, and possibly other community facilities, will depend on the availability of donor funding. KFOR has provided security around the valley, and no incidents have been reported. There have also been returns of Kosovo Serbs to the villages of Leshtar and Makresh (Gnjilane region), where they live in mixed communities with Kosovo Albanian neighbours.

20. The number of refugees from the neighbouring former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continued to decline and is now estimated at about 10,000.

V. Security

21. Security and freedom of movement for Kosovo's minority communities remain a serious concern. Although the level of serious crime involving members of minority communities decreased, the attack against two elderly Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo Polje at the end of November, resulting in the death of one, was a chilling reminder of the potential for violence against members of this community. KFOR reported an increase in cases of minor inter-ethnic intimidation and violence, with a number of juveniles involved in stone-throwing incidents against minority community targets, including individuals, convoys, vehicles, trains and houses. A slight increase in inter-ethnic violence in Gnjilane region was also reported, following the demobilization of the former so-called Liberation Army of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja, operating in Southern Serbia, and of the so-called National Liberation Army, operating in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

22. UNMIK and KFOR worked on several fronts to improve security. Efforts continued to remove unauthorized weapons, as part of a wider strategy to combat terrorism and organized crime. Joint search operations were stepped up, including operations along the borders and boundaries to limit the smuggling and storage of weapons and supplies in support of ethnic Albanian armed groups. On 1 December 2001, KFOR and UNMIK police launched the largest simultaneous weapons search operation so far, involving 3,000 soldiers from all five multinational brigades, which resulted in the arrest of 12 people and the seizure of an assorted range of weaponry. Although the immediate results have been modest, these operations are considered valuable in that they improve the operational cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK and reassure the law-abiding public, a crucial factor in building confidence in the rule of law. There are indications that victims of crimes may have become less susceptible to intimidation and more inclined to lodge complaints with UNMIK police. Notwithstanding the greater readiness to report crimes, the average level of serious crimes reported to UNMIK police dropped slightly in October and November.

23. The security situation in Mitrovica remained stable but tense. The number of violent incidents recorded by KFOR dropped over the last three months, despite continuing difficulties in establishing UNMIK's authority in the north. The improvement is partly attributable to a more active and robust approach by UNMIK police and KFOR towards the so-called "bridge-watchers". Through increased search and arrest operations, enhanced community policing, and targeted public information activities, the "bridge-watchers" appeared to be losing some of their support in northern Mitrovica. Problems persist, however, with Kosovo Serb hardliners, who remain capable of mobilizing their supporters quickly. A case in point is violence directed against UNMIK police and KFOR on 7 January 2002, the Orthodox Christmas Eve, when KFOR arrested one of the "bridgewatchers" for possession of a rifle. A crowd of Kosovo Serbs gathered and temporarily freed the individual, who was then rearrested by KFOR. In the period covered by the report, KFOR was the target of several grenade attacks and shots fired on its troops in northern Mitrovica.

24. The situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia does not appear to have had significant adverse effects on the general security situation in Kosovo during the reporting period. Parliamentary ratification of the Framework Agreement and the presidential amnesty granted to the former fighters of the so-called National Liberation Army (NLA), in particular, has reduced the likelihood of ex-National Liberation Army fighters illegally crossing into Kosovo.

VI. Other activities of UNMIK

A. Justice

25. There was further progress in the consolidation of the law and order structures. The Bar exam resumed in December 2001; the Kosovo Judicial Institute, run by Pillar III, provided legal education for judges and prosecutors from all ethnic communities; a code of ethics for judges and prosecutors was introduced; and the Kosovo Judicial and Prosecutorial Council was established to advise the Special Representative in discharging his disciplinary responsibilities for judges and prosecutors. Building the capacity of the domestic judiciary continues to be a focus of Pillar III. An important development in this regard was the establishment of the Criminal Defence Resource Centre, which assists and trains defence counsel, including those from minority communities and Serbia proper. The Department of Justice recently created the Judicial Integration Section to coordinate a minority recruitment strategy in the judiciary. Progress has remained slow, however, largely due to political difficulties, as well as pensions and security issues. Only 4 of the 16 appointed Kosovo Serb judges and prosecutors were serving in the Kosovo courts; there are also 9 Bosniac, 2 Roma, and 8 Turkish judges and prosecutors.

26. A continued high priority of UNMIK has been the fight against terrorism and organized crime. The links between organized crime and terrorism, as well as Balkan regional networks with operations in Kosovo, have the capacity to destabilize political and economic institutions and affect inter-ethnic relations. To strengthen its capacity in this area, Pillar I (Police and Justice) is setting up five new specialized units: (i) The Central Intelligence Unit within UNMIK Police has 40 specialized officers exclusively dedicated to gathering and analysing intelligence on organized criminal activities and terrorism. (ii) The Kosovo Organized Crime Bureau within the UNMIK police is an expert investigative unit, which develops intelligence provided by the Central Intelligence Unit into evidence for prosecution. It also coordinates UNMIK police operations in connection with the supply of illegal drugs and narcotics to Kosovo, and the use of Kosovo as a transit point for international drug trafficking. The Bureau is now staffed with 11 experts. (iii) The Sensitive Information and Operations Unit within the Department of Justice provides elements for prosecution to KFOR and UNMIK police on organized crime, terrorism and cross-border illegal activities. The Unit is intended to support UNMIK police and KFOR operations, process sensitive information for use in courtrooms, and provide expertise on organized crime and terrorism for international prosecutors and judges. (iv) The Legal Policy Unit within the Department of Justice will be the focal point for policy-making and liaison with Kosovo-based agencies. It will be staffed with four lawyers with extensive expertise in civil and criminal law. (v) The Victim Advocacy and Assistance Unit, within the Department of Justice, will provide assistance to witnesses and victims throughout the judicial process. In

addition, a new Economic Crime Unit has been established within Pillar IV, which has pioneered new measures against money-laundering. International judges and prosecutors will continue to handle serious cases of organized crime, since the risk of intimidation and corruption of local judges involved in cases against major criminals remains high.

27. On 19 December, three Kosovo Albanians suspected of involvement in the bombing of the Nis Express bus in February 2001 were released from custody on orders of the Supreme Court. It had not been possible to transform the intelligence — on the strength of which the three suspects had been detained — into evidence that would secure their conviction in a court of law.

28. Partly as a result of improved law enforcement, there is still an acute need to augment the prison capacity in Kosovo. At the current rate of increase, the prison population — already 780 inmates in December 2001 — will reach the total existing capacity of 1,000 beds by March 2002. The number of correctional staff must also increase. Police officers still carry out correctional duties for which they are not trained and which do not fall in their area of responsibility.

B. Police

29. UNMIK continued to build up the Kosovo Police Service. On 15 December, the seventeenth class graduated from the Kosovo Police Service School, which is run by Pillar III. This brings the total number of trained KPS officers to 4,392, of whom 375 (8.5 per cent) are Kosovo Serbs and 324 (7.3 per cent) from other minority communities. This year, approximately 1,100 candidates will receive basic training. The targeted overall strength of the Kosovo Police Service is 10,000. A recently introduced rank system means that first-line Kosovo Police Service supervisors are currently engaged in providing direct supervision of their colleagues, while the senior management ranks fulfil advisory functions alongside senior UNMIK police officers. More than 200 Kosovo Police Service officers have been selected and deployed to the UNMIK police central, regional, and border police headquarters. Kosovo Police Service officers have worked in tandem with international officers in high profile operations, such as providing security for the Assembly elections. In addition, Kosovo Police Service officers have conducted independent operations, ranging from regular patrols to murder investigations.

30. The Kosovo Police Service has been entrusted with the security of Assembly members within the Government Building. The newly formed Service Division of the Kosovo Police Service comprises 96 police officers trained to provide close protection to Assembly members. Special emphasis was placed on the security needs of the 22 Kosovo Serb Assembly members, who are protected by UNMIK police on their way to and from the Assembly. The Service Division of the Kosovo Police Service will be expanded in 2002 in order to provide security services to all the provisional institutions of self-government ministries. The first Kosovo Police Service close protection teams will be operational in February 2002, with a target of 180 operational close protection officers set for mid-2002. KFOR continued to assist UNMIK by providing area security and related support. There is, however, an urgent need to strengthen the UNMIK Close Protection Unit with international personnel to guarantee a minimum level of freedom of movement to Kosovo Serb Assembly members.

31. Within the limits of its capacity, the UNMIK police has also taken over some functions from KFOR. Thus, it has assumed responsibility for daily operations in four of the five regions; and in the remaining region (Mitrovica), UNMIK police already has full investigative primacy. In addition, it has assumed operational responsibility at six border and boundary crossing points; and at Slatina Airport, UNMIK's border police is expanding its area of responsibility.

32. Following the signing of the Common Document, important progress was made on the issues of missing persons and the detained. The UNMIK police Missing Persons Unit, which is in the process of establishing a sub-office in Belgrade, was informed in mid-December that it would be granted full access to post-mortem data collected by the Serbian police and forensic pathologists from various exhumation sites recently uncovered in Serbia. This will clear the way for the identification of hundreds of Kosovo Albanians exhumed from these sites over the past few months. The UNMIK/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Contact Group on Missing Persons made headway in drafting a Protocol on Joint Verification Teams on Hidden Prisons, which will enable UNMIK police and authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to investigate alleged sites. After a review of their cases according to international standards, the remaining Kosovo Albanian detainees in Serbian jails are to be transferred to Kosovo as soon as possible. Representatives of the Department of Justice have visited detention facilities in Serbia where Kosovo Albanians are held, and have consulted with representatives of the Serbian judiciary regarding the handover to UNMIK of relevant case-file information. The re-entry of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into Interpol has opened up new avenues for police cooperation, which UNMIK police has pursued through meetings in both Podgorica and Belgrade.

C. Capacity-building

33. The main focus of Pillar II (civil administration) during the period was the transfer of authority to the provisional institutions of self-government and to the municipalities, as outlined in paragraphs 9 to 13 above. In addition to the consolidation and reorganization of departments, it stepped up the recruitment of local staff, especially members of minorities, and prepared guidelines and administrative instructions for different administrative units. Similarly, Pillar III (institution-building) continued its capacity-building efforts, involving primarily the judicial sector and the police. As a result of its training, local staff now manage the Kosovo Law Centre and the Kosovo Judicial Institute. This year, Pillar III will undergo a significant reduction, as it shifts emphasis to programmatic as opposed to direct logistic support. The number of its field offices will be reduced from 21 to 9.

34. Key to the success of the provisional institutions of self-government is the development of a professional, and multi-ethnic Kosovo civil service. The basis for this is UNMIK regulation 2001/36, promulgated on 22 December 2001, which lays down transparent and non-discriminatory recruiting procedures and establishes mechanisms to ensure equitable minority representation. Major efforts of targeted minority recruitment took place in a number of the Transitional Departments. The Office of Community Affairs worked with the Transitional Department of Labour and Social Welfare to build up a database of potential minority recruits for the Kosovo Civil Service. Pillar III is currently working with local partners to establish the Kosovo Institute for Public Administration, which is to be funded by the Kosovo

consolidated budget and placed within the Ministry of Public Services. The Institute will be responsible for the development and implementation of a comprehensive training policy and programme for the civil service of Kosovo. Until the Kosovo Institute for Public Administration is fully established, Pillar III will continue to train civil servants through the Institute for Civil Administration. To date, approximately 3,600 municipal civil servants have undergone training, of whom 18 per cent are Kosovo Serbs.

D. Reconstruction and development

35. As an essential part of the preparations for the transfer of authority, UNMIK, through its Pillar IV, put together a fully funded budget for the incoming administration (see annex III below). The 2002 budget was drawn up with the aim of ensuring that all recurrent expenditures can be met by tax revenue generated domestically. There is still a large reliance on donor funding, however, as Kosovo is unable to borrow from international financial institutions for capital projects. An increased capacity for municipal governments to levy fees and taxes was factored into the overall budget plan. Complementary training programmes for elected politicians and opinion makers were designed to ensure that fiscal discipline is maintained when budgetary power is transferred in 2003. Eighty-five per cent of the domestically generated tax revenue still originates from taxation of goods coming into Kosovo. Partly in an effort to reduce dependence on this single means of revenue collection, new wage and profit taxes were readied for introduction early in 2002.

36. At the beginning of 2002, the euro became Kosovo's main currency. Approximately one billion deutsche marks in notes and coins are being taken out of circulation and replaced with the new currency in the first two months of the year. Preparing for this transition involved complex planning, especially in logistics and security. An extensive media campaign was launched to inform citizens and enterprises about the changeover to the euro.

37. The Banking and Payments Authority has now licensed seven commercial banks to operate in Kosovo. These are currently operating 22 branch offices throughout the territory. Licenses have also been granted to 15 microfinance and non-bank financial institutions, established to provide credit to individuals and small and medium-size enterprises. So far, some 200 million euros worth of deposits have been made in the banking system, and 40 million euros extended as loans. In addition, the Authority has so far licensed one foreign exchange bureau and five Western Union operations. It has also taken over from UNMIK responsibility for the regulation of the insurance industry. Existing insurance companies have been obliged to apply for a new license — five such applications have been received so far, and are being considered. New employees are currently being trained on insurance supervision activities.

38. The Department of Trade and Industry worked on legislation necessary for a market economy. Regulations on accounting standards, a pledge filing office, mortgages, competition law, and related administrative directions, were drawn up in the second half of 2001 and were, or are in the process of being, promulgated. Pending the establishment of an effective legal basis for large-scale privatization, the primary means for promoting economic development among Kosovo's socially

owned enterprises has been the leasing of productive assets to new management, with contracts awarded through a competitive tender process. Twelve such contracts have been concluded so far and a further eight are currently being drafted for a total volume of some 50 million euros and employment for more than 2,600 persons, more than doubling the workforce in the firms concerned. Some 35,000 private enterprises have now signed the UNMIK business registry.

39. Serious difficulties continued with the supply of electricity. Owing to ageing equipment and the lack of investments in recent years, electricity had to be strictly rationed. Even so, there were frequent power cuts. With generous support from the European Agency for Reconstruction, efforts are ongoing to solve this problem by training staff, restructuring the management of Kosovo Electric, and carrying out a comprehensive overhaul of the power-generating units. A particular effort was made to improve payment rates for electricity consumption in order to increase the capacity to import power. Problems with energy supply in Kosovo are deep-rooted and complex. A comprehensive analysis, funded by the World Bank and conducted during 2001, is expected to be completed early this year. With considerable donor investment in the infrastructure of the water sector and improved management of public utility service providers, water shortages were reduced in the second half of 2001.

40. Kosovo remains one of the poorest regions in Europe and has suffered from decades of underinvestment. The Department of Reconstruction has carried out a comprehensive analysis of investment needs, presenting a 1.4 billion euro capital expenditure plan for the next three years in the public investment programme for 2002-2004, a large section of which will need to be financed by the donor community.

VII. Observations

41. The Assembly election on 17 November 2001 constituted an important step forward in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). The electorate gave no single party a majority, compelling the political forces to work together to overcome the legacy of the past and contribute to the building of a common future. The time it is taking to elect a President and form a Government is an indication of the difficulties that will have to be overcome. The provisional institutions of self-government will have full responsibility over the areas under their authority, and my Special Representative will intervene only to uphold the provisions of resolution 1244 (1999) and the Constitutional Framework. I hope that those elected will use their mandates wisely and will reach out to one another, in the spirit of mutual respect and tolerance and constructive compromise.

42. Another positive development was the signing of the Common Document, which places UNMIK's relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on a solid footing. UNMIK will continue to work closely with the Yugoslav authorities to make progress on the issues identified in the Common Document. I look forward to the full participation of the representatives of the provisional institutions of self-government in this cooperation. Whatever the final determination of Kosovo's status may be, the relationship between Pristina and Belgrade will be crucial for the future well-being of the region.

43. Security remains of paramount concern. UNMIK and KFOR will do what they can to eliminate weapons and prevent violence. However, this alone cannot solve the problem; attitudes must change. Here, again, the newly elected Assembly members have a particular responsibility. They must clearly and openly reject violence and terrorism. All Assembly members are called upon to lead by example in creating conditions conducive to improving inter-communal relations and promoting reconciliation. Reconciliation must begin in the Assembly, as members of all communities work side by side to improve the situation of all the people of Kosovo. Non-governmental organizations, too, have a key role to play in the process of reconciliation.

44. UNMIK is reaching a critical stage in the implementation of its mandate and has made substantial changes in both structure and focus to encourage and support provisional self-government while upholding the provisions of resolution 1244 (1999). The next phase will require careful management and the continued, strong commitment of the international community.

45. In conclusion, I should like to express my gratitude to Mr. Hans Haekkerup for his steady leadership during a period that has seen significant progress, and to the men and women of UNMIK for their wonderful work in difficult circumstances. Mr. Haekkerup has decided for personal reasons not to continue in his post, and I shall be writing to the Security Council about his successor. I should also like to express my appreciation for the comprehensive support UNMIK received from regional organizations, agencies and contributing countries.

Annex I

Composition and strength of the UNMIK police (as of December 2001)

Country	*Number*	*Country*	*Number*
Argentina	147	Austria	70
Bangladesh	108	Benin	1
Bulgaria	93	Canada	56
Cameroon	21	Czech Republic	20
Denmark	30	Egypt	68
Fiji	34	Finland	25
France	81	Germany	332
Ghana	119	Greece	10
Hungary	5	Iceland	3
India	485	Italy	65
Côte d'Ivoire	1	Jordan	451
Kenya	26	Kyrgyzstan	2
Lithuania	9	Malaysia	48
Malawi	19	Nepal	49
Niger	3	Nigeria	81
Norway	27	Pakistan	222
Philippines	63	Poland	119
Portugal	20	Romania	68
Russian Federation	120	Senegal	15
Slovenia	15	Spain	127
Switzerland	6	Sweden	46
Tunisia	5	Turkey	125
Ukraine	176	United States	582
Zambia	38	Zimbabwe	61
Total			**4 465**

Annex II

Composition and strength of the military liaison component of UNMIK (as of December 2001)

Nationality	*Number of Liaison Officers*
Argentina	1
Austria	2
Bangladesh	1
Belgium	1
Bolivia	1
Bulgaria	1
Canada	1
Chile	1
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	1
Finland	2
Hungary	1
Ireland	3
Italy	1
Jordan	1
Kenya	1
Malawi	1
Malaysia	1
Nepal	1
New Zealand	1
Norway	1
Pakistan	1
Poland	1
Romania	1
Russian Federation	2
Spain	2
Switzerland	1
Ukraine	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1
United States of America	2
Zambia	1
Total	**38**

Annex III

A. Kosovo general budget as at 30 September 2001

(In millions of deutsche marks)*

	Budget (December 2000)	*September 2001*	*Year to end-September*		*Balance (3 months)*
			Plan	*Actual*	
Revenue					
Kosovo revenue	338.1	130.9	240.4	376.2	(38.1)
General donor grants	150.0	10.6	124.9	124.9	25.1
Designated donor grants	11.9	1.2	3.9	3.9	8.0
Total financing	**500.0**	**142.7**	**369.2**	**505.0**	**(5.0)**
Expenditure					
Salaries and wages	181.8	14.6	143.9	144.7	37.1
Goods and services	134.7	12.6	89.9	76.2	58.5
Subsidies and transfers	161.5	4.7	113.2	90.2	71.3
Capital outlays	22.1	0.7	18.2	9.0	13.1
Total expenditure	**500.0**	**32.6**	**365.2**	**320.1**	**179.9**

* Table may not add, due to rounding.

B. General budget — domestic revenue detail as at 30 September 2001

Domestic revenue	*Actual at 30 September 2001 (DM)*
Taxes:	**355 249 483**
Customs	62 470 074
Excise	97 242 892
Sales tax on imports	76 868 678
Hotel, food and beverage	1 679 431
Payroll	-
Presumptive	36 979 438
VAT	79 937 811
Property	-
Offences	71 159
Fees:	**20 933 698**
Airport departures	-
Health	-
Education	-
Courts	1 743 853
Central Fiscal Authority (CFA) — interest	2 775 769
Vehicle registration	10 947 761
Travel documents	5 466 315
Driver licence	-
Subtotal domestic revenue	**376 183 181**

Annex IV

Assembly election

Party standings	*Votes*	*Percent of votes*	*Seats*
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)	359 851	45.65	47
Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK)	202 622	25.70	26
Coalition Return (KP)	89 388	11.34	22
Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK)	61 688	7.83	8
Homeland (VATAN)	9 030	1.15	4
Kosovo Turkish Democratic Party (KDTP)	7 879	1.00	3
New Initiative for a Democratic Kosovo (IRDK)	3 976	0.50	2
Ashkali Albanian Democratic Party (PDASHK)	3 411	0.43	2
National Movement for Liberation of Kosovo (LKCK)	8 725	1.11	1
Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo (PSHDK)	7 701	0.98	1
Justice Party (PD)	4 504	0.57	1
People's Movement of Kosovo (LPK)	4 404	0.56	1
Bosniac Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo (BSDAK)	2 906	0.37	1
United Roma Party of Kosovo (PREBK)	2 717	0.34	1
Liberal Party of Kosovo (PLK)	3 600	0.46	
National Front (BK)	2 881	0.37	
Liberal Centre Party of Kosovo (PQLK)	2 403	0.30	
Green Party of Kosovo (PGJK)	2 325	0.29	
Social Democratic Party of Kosovo (PSDK)	1 785	0.23	
XHEVDET REXHAJ (Independent Candidate)	1 330	0.17	
LATIF KRYEZIU (Independent Candidate)	1 199	0.15	
XUN ÇETTA (Independent Candidate)	1 210	0.15	
Republican Party of Kosovo (PRK)	643	0.08	
Albanian National Democratic Party (PNDSH)	1 066	0.14	
Citizens' Initiative of Kosovo (IQK)	631	0.08	
Albanian Liberal Party (PLSH)	428	0.05	

Basic statistics	
Total electorate	1 249 987
Total ballots cast	803 796
Voter turnout in percentage	64.30 per cent
Total valid ballots	788 303

United Nations S/2002/63

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 January 2002

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the deputy representative of the United States of America on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a note verbale dated 14 January 2002 from the Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations stating that Richard S. Williamson has been appointed deputy representative of the United States of America on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that communication constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

02-21350 (E) 150102

United Nations S/2002/64

Security Council

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15 January 2002

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Letter dated 14 January 2002 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I am writing this letter to you concerning the atrocities committed during the Korean war (June 1950-July 1953) by the United States troops, of which information has been discovered recently in Sinchon county, South Hwanghae Province of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

On 14 November last year, remains of 59 people who had been massacred by the United States troops during their temporary occupation of Sinchon county throughout the Korean war and hundreds of their remains were newly unearthed at the foot of a mountain in the township of that county.

The remains were found from the depth of 40 centimetres from the surface of earth and in various positions; straight-lying and cross-lying bodies, bodies with foreheads down to the bottom of trench, bodies in sitting position, bodies with fingers that show writhing to dig out earth, etc. Among the remains are skulls bearing four traces of bullets and skulls bearing holes of a fist size showing that they were hit by a mass of iron or heavy stone, thus leaving few remains with intact skulls. Skulls with hoes and clamps stuck in them were also unearthed. In addition, skulls with holes of bullets which pierced through forehead and temple, remains showing clear traces that they were picked by axe and spade, crushed skulls buried together with big stones, indicating that they were beaten by big stones, broken arm and leg bones, showing that they were hit by iron stick or butt of rifle, were discovered. There was a considerable number of remains of which body and leg bones were discovered a few metres apart from the spot where their skulls were unearthed. This shows that the United States troops cold-bloodedly slaughtered innocent people by cutting their neck, waist and legs and buried them separately to cover up their crimes of atrocities.

The relics including cigarette holders, bundles of keys, shoehorns, cap-badge of high school, various buttons of clothes of different age, hairpins, etc., which were discovered along with the remains, prove that those killed were peaceful inhabitants.

The atrocities of the United States troops newly discovered this time in Sinchon county, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, after the publication in September 1999 of the mass killing by GIs of over 400 innocent population in July 1950 at Rogun-ri, Yongdong county of North Chungchong Province of south Korea are stirring up indignation not only of the entire Korean people but also of the international community.

02-21398 (E) 160102

The United States troops occupied Sinchon county from 17 October to 7 December 1950. The then commander of the United States troops occupying Sinchon county, Lieutenant Harrison, saying "My order is law. Those who disobey the order will be shot to death at discretion", drove his GIs to mass killing and consequently, during the period of temporary occupation of less than two months, 35,383 innocent civilians, a quarter of the then total population of Sinchon county, were cruelly slaughtered in most inhumane ways.

As is widely known, the three-year-long Korean war of the past, which had been imposed by the United States, was a war of aggression that inflicted all forms of misery and sufferings upon the Korean people.

The atrocities committed by the United States troops during the Korean war exceed by far the crimes against humanity committed by Hitler of Germany and Tojo of Japan during the Second World War.

I wish to draw your attention to the fact that the atrocities committed by the United States troops during the Korean war represent the acts of crimes against humanity that deserve international denunciation and punishment in accordance with international law. I particularly emphasize that the Korean people possess the due right to strictly settle accounts with the atrocities of the United States troops.

What is more serious is that the United States troops veiled the aggressiveness of war under the cover of "United Nations Forces" and committed the crimes against humanity using the name of the United Nations.

The United Nations should bear due responsibility for this, and will have to thoroughly investigate criminal acts of the United States troops and take measures to prevent the recurrence of such crimes against humanity.

The United States troops in south Korea are not defenders of peace but aggressive forces, being the root cause of the division of Korea and all misfortunes of the Korean people.

The United Nations will have to adjust its mistaken past by retrieving its flag and name from the United States troops in south Korea as early as possible and recover its credibility.

I would be grateful if you should have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Pak** Gil Yon
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2002/65

Security Council

Distr.: General
15 January 2002

Original: English

Letter dated 14 January 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Afghanistan addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the first report of the Monitoring Group on Afghanistan established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1363 (2001). The Committee considered the report at its 9th meeting, held on 14 January 2002, and recommended its submission to the Security Council in view of the measures currently under discussion with regard to paragraph 23 of Security Council resolution 1333 (2000).

(*Signed*) Alfonso **Valdivieso**
Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Afghanistan

02-21440 (E) 170102

Annex

First Report of the Monitoring Group on Afghanistan Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1363 (2001)

Executive Summary

In paragraph 5 of its resolution 1363 (2001) the Security Council requested that the Monitoring Group report to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) regarding the work of the monitoring mechanism established by resolution 1363 (2001). The mechanism was tasked to monitor the implementation of the measures imposed by resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000); and to collate, assess, verify wherever possible, report and make recommendations on information regarding violations of the measures imposed.

The events of 11 September 2001 and subsequent actions taken by the international coalition of nations against the Taliban regime and Al-Qaida have changed the situation significantly with respect to Security Council Resolution 1363 and requirements stipulated in Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1333. Given the coalition's activity against the Taliban and Al-Qaida it has not been possible to proceed with the deployment of the Sanctions Enforcement Support Team (SEST). Meanwhile, in the short time that they have been together, the members of the Monitoring Group have made significant strides towards fulfilling their mandate.

The Monitoring Group considers that the Taliban and remnants of Al-Qaida are likely to remain a potential threat to the peace process in Afghanistan and in the region for some considerable time to come. Based upon its assessment the Group recommends that the weapons embargo be maintained against the Taliban, Al-Qaida and their sympathizers.

Additionally, the Security Council may also wish to consider an arms embargo for the whole of Afghanistan. The modalities for monitoring and enforcing such an arrangement would need to be worked out.

The Monitoring Group recommends that the freezing of funds and other financial assets of individuals, entities related or associated with the Taliban, Al-Qaida and Usama Bin Laden as defined in resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) be maintained and monitored for compliance.

The Group recommends that as soon as the situation on the ground permits, a process of verification of all known terrorist training facilities be undertaken by the monitoring component of the Mechanism.

It is the view of the Monitoring Group that the closure of production facilities and storage sites for illicit drugs be internationally verified.

The Group also recommends that the monitoring component of the Mechanism be maintained. It is proposed that it be renamed to Monitoring and Advisory Teams (MAAT).

The Monitoring Group suggests that an effective border control service, including customs and immigration, need to be implemented by the Afghan authorities, as a matter of priority.

I. Introduction and Background

1. Security Council Resolution 1363 (2001) established a mechanism "...to monitor the implementation of the measures imposed by resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000); and "...to collate, assess, verify wherever possible, report and make recommendations on information regarding violations of the measures imposed by resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000);"[1]

2. The Security Council decided that the mechanism be comprised of :

(a) "...a Monitoring Group in New York of up to five experts, including a Chairman, to monitor the implementation of all the measures imposed by resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000), including in the fields of arms embargoes, counter-terrorism and related legislation, and in view of the link to the purchase of arms and financing of terrorism, money laundering, financial transactions and drug trafficking; and..."

(b) "... a Sanctions Enforcement Support Team, under the coordination of the Monitoring Group...to be located in the states bordering Afghanistan...".

3. The Monitoring Group was accordingly appointed by the Secretary-General and commenced its work during October 2001. The Group consists of: Mr. Michael Chandler (United Kingdom), Chairman, Mr. Hasan Ali Abaza (Jordan), Mr. Philippe Graver (France), Mr. Michael Langan (United States of America) and Mr. Surendra Shah (Nepal).

4. This report highlights the progress made to date by the Monitoring Group on Afghanistan concerning the implementation of its mandate under SCR 1363 (2001) and makes recommendations as to the areas on which the Group should concentrate in the future.

5. Circumstances since the passing of the Resolution have greatly affected the Monitoring Group's approach to the work. The events of 11 September 2001 and subsequent actions taken by the international coalition of nations against the Taliban regime and Al-Qaida have changed the situation significantly with respect to resolution 1363 (2001) and requirements stipulated in resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000). Given the coalition's activity against the Taliban and Al-Qaida it has not been possible to proceed with the deployment of the Sanctions Enforcement Support Team (SEST). Notwithstanding this drawback, the Group has made considerable progress in the short time it has been together.

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[1] SCR 1267 (1999) required the cessation of sanctuary and terrorist training within Afghanistan, the handing over of Usama bin Laden by the Taliban, aviation restrictions on the Taliban and the freezing of overseas funds and other financial resources of the Taliban. SCR 1333 (2000) reasserted the principle of no sanctuary for terrorist training, the closure of terrorist camps, the handing over of Usama bin Laden, a ban on the sale or supply of arms or materiel to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, the elimination of all illicit drugs, additional aviation restrictions on the Taliban, and the freezing of funds of bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network.

II. Methodology

6. Comprehensive, accurate information is crucial to the work of the Monitoring Group. In this respect the Group is building a number of databases, relevant to its mandate, and also has undertaken a series of visits to agencies and organisations based in Europe with which it has established close working links and an effective exchange of information. These included the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP), the *Wassenaar* Arrangement Secretariat, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), INTERPOL, the World Customs Organisation (WCO), and EUROPOL. In addition, meetings were held with government representatives of certain Member States and individuals, identified by the Group, who were able to provide important background material.

7. At the United Nations Headquarters in New York, the Monitoring Group met with the Permanent Representatives of Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to discuss offers of assistance which might be helpful to those countries in fulfilling their obligations relative to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000) and 1363 (2001).

III. Findings of the Monitoring Group

A. General observations

8. For the purposes of the arms embargoes and terrorist training facilities, Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000), refer to "…. the territory of Afghanistan under Taliban control…" This meant the approximate 90% of Afghanistan deemed to have been under the control of the Taliban regime until the international coalition offensive started. At the time of closing this report, the Taliban no longer hold any significant portion of Afghanistan. A specific leadership may have been compromised, but the impulse by external forces to influence the thinking of segments of Afghanistan's population, is a major concern to the Monitoring Group.

9. The number of former Taliban within Afghanistan was variably defined. Before the events of 11 September 2001, estimates ranged from 30,000 to 50,000 Taliban troops or militia including foreign fighters (or Afghan-Arabs, i.e. members of Al-Qaida). Since then, many of the Taliban who are indigenous Afghans or Pashtuns from the Pakistan provinces bordering Afghanistan have 'melted' back into the countryside. A number of instances of banditry and highway robbery have been reported, particularly in the areas from where the Taliban derived their support.

10. Consequently, the possibility cannot be ignored that the Taliban and their supporters still possess the means to stage an uprising. Past experience of post-conflict situations has shown the readiness of warring factions to use periods of a truce to re-arm and replenish stockpiles of ammunition, ready to revert to an armed struggle to settle their grievances in the event that they perceive the political settlement not to their liking. The Group considers that support for the Taliban regime still exists in many places. Due to the strength of this support, the Taliban and Al-Qaida are likely to remain a threat for some time to come.

11. Similarly, the Group is concerned with the continued presence, inside Afghanistan, of other terrorist groups, such as the Islamic Movement for Uzbekistan (IMU), Chechnyan guerrillas

and Muslim secessionists or Uygurs from the Western Chinese province of Xinjiang. Although the Monitoring Group is aware that some members of these groups were in Kunduz when it fell to the Northern Alliance and were observed as prisoners in Mazar-e-Sharif, their current whereabouts requires to be verified and recorded.

12. During meetings with some international law enforcement agencies, it became evident that information, which the Group requires to fulfil its mandate, is not available or could not be divulged by some of the agencies with whom the Group consulted. Linkages between the Taliban, Al-Qaida and organized crime networks, for example, are commonly agreed to exist but were not elaborated upon by those law enforcement agencies visited. The Group is looking into possible ways to ensure that such information can be released to it in a viable form.

13. Indeed, the Group considers that the sharing of information between elements of the international law enforcement community concerning the Taliban, Al-Qaida and organized crime must be improved. The ability of terrorists to network internationally – by linking each others' cells, through the movement of funds and people and with detailed planning – requires a reorientation and rethinking by international law enforcement agencies on how they will respond. It is of utmost importance that intelligence and police services worldwide cooperate to a far greater degree in pursuing international terrorist threats. Failure to rectify the international law enforcement community's possessive attitude towards crucial information could have adverse consequences for achieving counter-terrorist objectives.

14. The Group is taking the necessary steps to improve its working arrangements with the various international law enforcement agencies. For example, the Group is looking into the possibility of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Europol and the United Nations, similar to the one that already exists with Interpol.

B. Enforcing the Arms Embargo

15. The Monitoring Group considers that the single gravest threat to the Interim Administration and to lasting peace in Afghanistan is the unregulated and uncontrolled flow of weapons and military supplies to the different factions within Afghanistan.

16. The enclosure on Afghan Weaponry (attached to this report), compiled by the Monitoring Group, underlines the fact that, according to information from competent sources, the Taliban could possibly possess surface-to-surface missiles, such as ***Scud B17*** and ***Frog 7***. The ranges of the missiles are 280 – 300 kilometres for the ***Scud B17*** and 70 kilometres for the ***Frog 7***. These missiles may be fitted with conventional, chemical or nuclear warheads. At the moment, it is not knows whether these missiles are operational, or, where they are located. The latest information available to the Group is that, prior to the coalition offensive, there were c.100 ***Scud*** missiles and at least four ***Scud*** mobile launch units (type ***TEL***) in Afghanistan. The Group is attempting to determine 'the distribution' of these systems between the various factions in Afghanistan.

17. It has also been reported that the Taliban possess stockpiles of chemical shells, ***Sarin*** and ***VX*** gas projectiles, which could be fired by the M46 130 mm gun. The Monitoring Group has not been able to verify the locations or quantities of these weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

18. The Monitoring Group is concerned that Al-Qaida, the Taliban or their sympathizers could well use these missiles to deliver WMD in future attacks including against the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Consequently these weapons systems should be located, monitored and their operational status verified.

19. Following coalition activities in Afghanistan, evidence has come to light of Al-Qaida's interest in the manufacture of WMD, however crude some of them may appear. The intentions of radical terrorist groups linked to Al-Qaida could be highlighted by the recent activities of members of militant groups such as the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM).

20. Additionally, the task of determining the provenance of weapons is made more complicated due to the number of countries in which similar models are manufactured. It is quite difficult to distinguish a piece of Taliban military equipment from one used by the Northern Alliance. For instance, one of the most famous and versatile artillery pieces is the 122 mm howitzer D-30. More than 10,000 of these howitzers have been produced and fielded in no less than 65 countries. Although of Russian origin, they have been produced under license by eight countries.

21. Various United Nations panels have already recommended measures to be taken by Member States to implement effective controls to combat the illegal trafficking in weapons (import, transit, export) that might take place in their territory. Therefore, an effective arms embargo would not be possible without maximum cooperation of the countries bordering Afghanistan and those from which cargo flights are known to have taken place, carrying arms and ammunition in breach of United Nations sanctions. [2]

22. The Monitoring Group is concerned that certain individuals, including Victor Bout, referred to in other United Nations reports, could have been involved or may be tempted in the future to become involved, in the illegal supply of arms and ammunition to the Taliban, their sympathisers and elements of Al-Qaida. The Group has reliable information on that which it is in the process of evaluating. This task could be expedited with the presence of monitors on the ground.

23. Therefore, the Group considers that a clear requirement still exists for the deployment of the monitoring component of the Mechanism, which is also able to assist the Members States bordering Afghanistan to implement the appropriate measures and to verify and report on the effectiveness of these measures.

C. Drug Trafficking

24. The production of and trafficking in heroin and opiates continues to be a source of funds for the Taliban and Al-Qaida, who make use of internationally organized crime networks as they move drugs from Afghanistan to markets in Europe. In return, they acquire cash, or its equivalent, e.g., diamonds, military equipment and small arms, to continue their struggle. In many cases it is the same groups of individuals who are involved in all these illegal activities.

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[2] Chapter 7, Design and Implementation of Arms Embargos and Travel and Aviation Related Sanctions – Results of the Bonn-Berlin Process, BICC. Bonn 2001.

25. It is no secret that the production of illicit drugs, their trafficking and drug addiction are widespread in the Central Asian region. The Group took note of a number of positive steps which have been taken to strengthen controls in the region against the illicit production and trafficking in drugs, in particular opiates, but also noted that much more effort and funding is required. The "Six Plus Two" group, China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, plus the Russian Federation and the USA, established a Working Group in September 2000, which "...with UNDCP assistance, elaborated and approved a Regional Action Plan for countering the Afghan drug threat."

26. The September 2001 Report of the UNODCCP summarises the reasons for the transhipment of drugs through Central Asia. The region is the natural transit zone between Afghanistan and Eastern and Western Europe. The risk level of moving drugs across certain parts of Afghanistan's border is low, due to poor controls in neighbouring states and the inability to make comprehensive interdiction efforts. For example, the implementation of strengthened control measures by Iran has forced the drug traffickers to use alternative routes, which can be described as 'softer', in order to avoid detection.[3]

27. The Report indicates that "... large amounts of opium, heroin and hashish of Afghan origin are trafficked into Central Asia mainly via Tajikistan, as well as across Uzbekistan's borders with Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan's very extensive frontiers both with Afghanistan and Iran...". Notwithstanding the ban on poppy cultivation, imposed by the Taliban regime in the year 2000, there have been suggestions that considerable quantities of opium were stockpiled in Afghanistan. Recent reports of the movement of opiates into the countries bordering Afghanistan, particularly in recent weeks, lend cr' 'ibility to these earlier assumptions. It is also believed that many of the stockpiles of opium ε .n and heroin, which existed in "...Taliban controlled areas of Afghanistan..." have been moved closer to the 'soft' borders or immediately outside Afghanistan itself.

28. In addition, there have been reports that a considerable number of 'laboratories' are known to have been operating inside Afghanistan. These require to be identified, closed down and certified as such.

29. During its visit to the WCO, the Group received a number of encouraging suggestions. The WCO publishes a detailed annual Customs and Drugs Report which is intended for the use of its members and law enforcement agencies. Seizures of illicit drugs, precursor chemicals and cash are reported to the WCO and disseminated in this global overview that stresses international partnership as a key to the enforcement of effective controls against illegal drugs trafficking. The Group considers that close cooperation with the WCO in respect to the support required by the countries bordering Afghanistan would be beneficial, particularly in view of the role played by national customs and other border security services in the fight against organized crime.

30. The Group has been briefed and received a number of favourable reports on "Operation Topaz", concerning the impact of stricter international controls implemented by drug control and

[3] UN International Drug Control Programme Current/Planned Activities in Central Asia Illicit Drugs Situation in Central Asia and UNDCP Response, September 2001, p.1

law enforcement agencies throughout Europe and Asia. These reports indicate an increase in seizures of precursor chemicals, particularly acetic anhydride.

31. Meanwhile, information received by the Group indicates a return to poppy cultivation as Afghan farmers look to crops which can realise a rapid "cash return" in the post-conflict environment. This raises the spectre of additional funds again being available to the Taliban, Al-Qaida and their sympathisers. In order to negate this concern, the international community must fulfil its promise of support for the development of substitute crops in Afghanistan. In addition, the Interim Administration should be encouraged to implement a ban on poppy cultivation throughout the country, in keeping with paragraph 6, Annex III of the Bonn Agreement. [4]

D. Financial Assets Seizures

32. Although the Taliban and Al-Qaida networks undoubtedly benefited (and may still be,) from the proceeds of the opium and heroin trade, the bulk of their financing has come from a variety of sources and from many countries, through entities which support their terrorist ideology. The collection methods included excising funds from wealthy individuals, legitimate businesses, charities, religious centres and profits from cooperative enterprises with organized crime.

33. In addition the Taliban also derived a considerable amount of their 'income' by making improper use of the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA).[5] Besides providing the ideal cover for smuggling high value goods into Afghanistan, which then found their way illegally into the neighbouring countries, in particular Pakistan, the ATTA also facilitated the movement of arms and ammunition into, and drugs out-of, Afghanistan. Consequently, the Monitoring Group considers that, should the ATTA be re-introduced, its terms and conditions require to be revised to ensure the inclusion of controls that are effective and that can be monitored.

34. Following the visit to UNODCCP, the Group has been provided with access to the anti-Money Laundering Information Database (AMLID) which is part of the UNODCCP Global Programme Against Money Laundering. The Group has also learnt that Interpol has reached an agreement with the United States to create a database that will provide law enforcement agencies around the world with quick access to information for the crackdown on terrorist financial networks. Interpol members will be expected to provide information on any accounts in their jurisdictions linked to the names in the database. This information will likewise become available in global plans to track terrorist funds.

35. The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Afghanistan issued a consolidated list on 26 November 2001 containing the names of individuals and entities whose funds and other financial resources should be frozen, as designated by resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000). An Addendum to the list was issued on 26 December 2001. Member States were requested to provide the Committee with information

[4] Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, 5 December 2001.

[5] In 1950 Pakistan gave Afghanistan permission to import duty-free goods through the port of Karachi. The Agreement was expanded in the 1980's.

regarding additional measures adopted or requests for additions or deletions of names from the list. The Group has been advised, informally, that compliance with the measures, in a number of cases, has being less than adequate. The Group is developing a plan of action by which to investigate these allegations and promote better compliance.

E. Terrorist Training Facilities

36. The Group has obtained information from a variety of sources concerning the location of at least 100 terrorist training facilities, as known prior to the coalition action in Afghanistan. It should be noted that numbers depend on varying definitions of "a training facility", some being simple camps from which to conduct basic military training and others comprised of extensive storage and support facilities. At the time of writing, the Group has been unable to confirm the accuracy and the totality of this information. However, the Group considers that, in order for it to complete its task, in particular with respect to resolution 1363 (2001), a process of monitoring and verification of all the known terrorist training facilities should be undertaken as soon as the situation on the ground in Afghanistan permits. Regrettably, other training facilities, established to support Al-Qaida and the Taliban are not confined to the borders of Afghanistan.

IV. Conclusions

37. The Taliban, remnants of Al-Qaida, their many sympathisers and other terrorist groups that had been fighting in Afghanistan are likely to remain a potential threat to the peace process in Afghanistan and in the region for some considerable time to come.

38. The flow of arms into, within and from Afghanistan has always been seen as long-term cause of insecurity and instability in the Central Asian region. In addition, the existence of WMD and potential means for their delivery require to be verified and brought under control. Therefore, effective arms control measures need to be implemented by the countries bordering Afghanistan, reinforced and monitored at the regional and international levels, in order to confront this ongoing challenge to international peace and security.

39. It is important that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants be undertaken as soon as possible.

40. Despite the efforts of UNODCCP within Afghanistan and the bordering states, drug production and trafficking continue to be major problems. Structural, financial and institution-building support, as recommended by the UNDCP, must be forthcoming immediately to cope with this overwhelming and society-destroying threat. The cultivation and trafficking of illicit drugs must be combated by the Interim Administration, in conjunction with countries in the region, the United Nations and other appropriate institutions.

41. 'Terror money' - using financial crimes, that include money laundering, for Al-Qaida and Usama bin Laden - can be traced and its effectiveness diminished by means of international cooperation that begins on the local level. The majority of the Member States, which are of particular interest to the Monitoring Group, have responded to the demands of the Security Council contained in the resolutions 1267(1999) and 1333 (2000) with respect to the freezing of

financial assets. However, there appear to be some gaps in the depths of compliance which the Group has not so far been able to substantiate.

42. Should it be deemed appropriate to re-instate the ATTA, the Agreement should be revised so that it cannot be abused thus providing financial benefit to factions, fiefdoms and individuals at the expense of the recognised governments.

43. Despite the reported coalition action against terrorist training facilities in Afghanistan, the scope of damage inflicted and the general status of these facilities remain unknown to the Group. Therefore, the Group considers, that until their status can be fully verified, the presence of these facilities may, if reused by factions at odds with the Interim Administration, continue to present a threat to peace and security, not only to Afghanistan, but also to the region as a whole.

44. Afghanistan's borders must be controlled from within and without the country. Responsibility for the internal control of Afghanistan's borders rests with the governmental authorities of Afghanistan. In the current circumstances this will be difficult to achieve given that the necessary components, e.g. customs, and immigration services, have not yet been effectively established. Consequently, the onus for effective border controls is likely to fall heavily on Afghanistan's neighbours for the foreseeable future.

45. It appears to the Group that reservations, with regard to the exchange of crucial information concerning the Taliban, Al-Qaida, their sympathisers and organised crime, still exist between international law enforcement agencies, despite the events of 11 September. For example, detailed information about the results of investigations and the legal action taken, subsequent to known seizures was not forthcoming. The Monitoring Group considers that better cooperation and coordination concerning the exchange of crucial information will enhance the fight against international terrorism.

V. Recommendations

46. The Group recommends that the weapons embargo be maintained against the Taliban, Al-Qaida and their sympathizers.

47. Additionally, to avoid proliferation of weapons, the Security Council may also wish to consider an arms embargo (or a moratorium on weapons) for the whole of Afghanistan. Exceptions supported by the United Nations for the supply of arms and ammunition would be made for those forces under the command of the Ministry of Defence of the Interim Administration engaged in operations against the Taliban and Al-Qaida and charged with the maintenance of public security and law and order throughout Afghanistan. The modalities for monitoring and enforcing such an arrangement will need to be worked out.

48. It is recommended that a programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants be undertaken as soon as possible in parallel with the restructuring of the armed and security forces in Afghanistan.

49. The Monitoring Group recommends that an effective border control service, including customs and immigration, be implemented by the Afghan authorities, as a matter of priority.

50. The requirement for a monitoring component of the Mechanism still exists. Accordingly, the Group recommends that the name, Sanctions Enforcement-Support Team (SEST), be changed to Monitoring and Advisory Teams (MAAT). In addition the Group recommends that some of the people assigned to the MAAT possess different skills and experience from those originally envisaged for the SEST, as specified under the terms of resolution 1363 (2001).

51. It is essential that the closure of former drug production facilities – and storage sites for illicit drugs – within Afghanistan be internationally verified. This activity could be undertaken by members of the MAAT in close cooperation with existing entities dealing with the issue.

52. The Interim Administration and their successors must be encouraged to impose a ban on the cultivation of opium poppies throughout Afghanistan, backed by the widespread introduction of substitute crops. This latter programme will require technical and financial support from the international community.

53. It is recommended that the freezing of funds and other financial assets of individuals, entities related or associated with the Taliban, Al-Qaida and Usama Bin Laden as defined in resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) be maintained and monitored for full compliance.

54. The Group strongly recommends that some members of the MAAT have skills and experience in financial investigations. This will enable them to offer assistance to national governments and central bank authorities on improving their legal frameworks, compliance initiatives and enforcement mechanisms.[6]

54. Terrorist training facilities and camps in Afghanistan must be verified as inoperable. For the foreseeable future all such facilities require to be identified, their status verified and monitored for closure, to assure compliance with relevant resolutions. This will require the deployment of monitoring teams to Afghanistan.

[6] pp. x-xii, Targeted Financial Sanctions A Manual For Design And Implementation Contributions From The Interlaken Process, The Swiss Confederation in cooperation with the United Nations Secretariat and the Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University. 2000

Enclosure

Afghan Weaponry

Table of military hardware of the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, as of September 2001.

Main Battle Tank	T-54/-55 T-62/-64	250 - 300	T-54/-55 T-62/-64	Less than 200
Armoured Vehicles	Various types	Around 300	Various types	Around 150
Artillery	Various types	600 - 800	Various types	Less than 500
Multiple Launch Rocket Systems	Various types	Less than 100	Various types	Around 80
Ground to Ground Missiles	R-17 Scud B R-70 Frog 7	Unknown Unknown	R-17 Scud B R-70 Frog 7	25-30 Around 10
Air Defence Systems	SA-7 Grail SA-13 Gopher FIM-92A-Stinger Blowpipe	Unknown Unknown Unknown	SA-7 Grail SA-13 Gopher FIM-92A-Stinger	Unknown Unknown Unknown
Antitank Guided Weapons	Milan	Unknown	Milan 9M 11 Fagot	Unknown About 10
Combat Aircraft	MIG 17/21 Sukhoi 17/20/22	20 - 30	MIG 17/21 Sukhoi17/20/22	Around 10 None
Training Aircraft	L-39C Albatros	4	None	None
Transport Aircraft	Antonov 12/24/26/32	16	Antonov 12/24/26/32	About 10
Attack Helicopters	MI-24 Hind	10	MI-24 Hind	2
Transport Helicopters	MI-8/-17 Hip	About 40	MI-8/-17 Hip	Less than 10

Source: Various sources as compiled by the Monitoring Group.

After the Soviet Armed Forces had left Afghanistan in 1991, the military hardware possessed either by the Afghan armed forces or the Mujahideen appeared to be as follows:

Afghan armed forces:
(Afghan communist forces as known at the time of the withdrawal of the Soviet Armed Forces.)

Tanks	1568
Armoured infantry fighting and transport vehicles	828
Artillery pieces	4880

Combat aircraft	126
Combat helicopters	14
Scud missiles	12
Frog 7 missiles	10

Mujahideen forces:

Tanks	97
Armoured infantry fighting and transport vehicles	160
Anti-aircraft heavy machine guns	5000
Mortars	3500
Recoilless rifles	2000
Antitank weapons	11000

Source: Various sources as compiled by the Monitoring Group.

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Security Council

Distr.: General
15 January 2002

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of Mauritius on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received credentials, signed on 8 January 2002 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Regional Cooperation of the Republic of Mauritius, stating that Bineshwaree Napaul has been appointed alternate representative of Mauritius on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, these credentials are in order.

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Letter dated 15 January 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council

I refer to my letter dated 19 October 2001 (S/2001/986) and its annex, which set out a work programme for the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) (the Counter-Terrorism Committee) for the first 90-day period. I attach herewith the Counter-Terrorism Committee's work programme for the second 90-day period.

The Committee welcomes the support it has received from the United Nations membership in the implementation of its mandate in the first 90 days and looks forward to receiving further cooperation in the coming work period. The Committee will continue to operate even-handedly and transparently in its work. As Chairman, I will continue to brief the wider membership regularly on the work of the Committee and to be accessible to them.

The Committee's focus in the second 90-day period will be on the reports submitted by States pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001). The work programme sets out the Committee's intention, with the help and advice of experts appointed for this purpose by the Secretary-General, to review all reports by the end of this work period. The Committee welcomes the reports received so far from 119 States on their implementation of the measures contained in resolution 1373 (2001). It calls upon States which have not yet submitted a first report to do so as quickly as possible.

I would be grateful if you could arrange for the present letter and its annex to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Jeremy **Greenstock**
Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism

02-21416 (E) 150102

Annex to the letter dated 15 January 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council

Work Programme of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (28 December 2001-27 March 2002)

The present document sets out the work programme of the Counter-Terrorism Committee for its second 90 days from the adoption of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001 (i.e. the period from 28 December 2001 to 27 March 2002). This work programme updates the programme submitted for the first 90-day period.

Summary

The Committee will:

By 31 January 2002:

- Publish a revised list of contact points (see para. 1 below);
- Establish a core of experts and a pool of experts (para. 2);
- Begin processing the first set of reports (para. 3);

By 28 February 2002:

- Have reviewed one third of the first set of reports (para. 3);
- Establish a directory of available assistance in the areas covered by resolution 1373 (2001) (para. 4);

By 27 March 2002:

- Have completed the review of two thirds of the first set of reports (para. 3).

Detail

1. Contact points

The Counter-Terrorism Committee has taken steps to facilitate dialogue with States and relevant international organizations and between States about the matters covered by Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) through the publication of a directory of contact points.

The Committee will update the directory by 31 January 2002 and at regular intervals thereafter. It encourages all States to make use of the directory for contacts on matters covered by resolution 1373 (2001) and to strengthen cooperation in this area. Those few States that have not yet submitted contact points are requested to do so as soon as possible.

2. Advisers to the Committee

A group of experts had been appointed to advise the Counter-Terrorism Committee on its work. Six independent advisers have been appointed by the

Secretariat with the approval of the Committee and will be available to the Committee throughout the period covered by the present work programme. The Secretariat has also identified a wider pool of experts who will be available to advise the Committee as required and will continue to gather the curricula vitae of candidates nominated by States.

Each State's report will be reviewed by the experts, who will prepare a written analysis for the Committee and its Sub-Committees (see below) on what follow-up (if any) is needed to the first report and what kind of assistance (if any) is requested or required.

3. Reporting by States

To assist States in fulfilling their obligation under paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001) to report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee on the steps they have taken to implement the resolution, the Committee produced guidelines for the submission of reports.

The Committee has established three Sub-Committees, each made up of five of its members, to have an initial discussion of each report and experts' analysis. The relevant Sub-Committee will invite representatives of the State concerned to attend part of the Sub-Committee's discussion of the report. Experts will also be present. The Sub-Committee will report to the Committee on the conclusions reached and any proposed follow-up action.

The Committee will consider each report, together with the conclusions reached on it by the Sub-Committee. The Committee will follow up with the State concerned, through a letter from its Chairman (not for wider circulation) setting out the substance of the discussion and any concerns expressed over the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001). The Committee will inform each State of a time line for the submission of further information or of a further report.

The Chairman of the Committee will also write to the President of the Security Council to record the fact that the Committee has considered the report of a State. That letter will be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

The Committee will aim to review by 28 February one third of the reports submitted and by 27 March two thirds of the reports submitted.

It will also follow up urgently with States that have not submitted a report.

4. Assistance

In order to assist States in their implementation of resolution 1373 (2001), the Counter-Terrorism Committee will compile a directory of sources of advice and expertise in the areas of legislative and administrative practice covered by the resolution. It has invited States to inform the Committee of any available assistance in the areas covered by the resolution, including:

(a) Relevant technical assistance programmes;

(b) Available financial assistance;

(c) Examples or sources of model legislation or regulation;

(d) Information on administrative practices;

(e) Sources of expertise.

The directory will be set up by 28 February 2002 and will be updated immediately as new information is submitted.

Member States requiring assistance may so inform the Committee either in their reports or separately at any time.

The Committee will continue its contacts with potential assistance providers.

5. Transparency in the work of the Committee

The Counter-Terrorism Committee will continue to communicate regularly information on its activities, including through briefings by the Chairman.

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Security Council

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Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements of its President concerning the situation in Sierra Leone,

Affirming the commitment of all States to respect the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of Sierra Leone,

Welcoming the significant progress made in the peace process in Sierra Leone, determining that the situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region, and calling for the further consolidation and advancement of the peace process,

Welcoming the official completion of the disarmament process, calling for the continuation of efforts to collect arms remaining in the hands of the civilian population, including ex-combatants, and urging the international community to provide adequate resources for the reintegration programme,

Emphasizing the importance of free, fair, transparent and inclusive elections for the long-term stability of Sierra Leone, and, in this regard, stressing the importance of all political parties having the freedom to campaign and having unrestricted access to the media,

Welcoming the progress made by the Government of Sierra Leone and the National Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone in preparing for elections, with the assistance of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and encouraging further efforts, particularly by the National Electoral Commission, in this regard,

Stressing the primary responsibility of the Sierra Leone Police for the maintenance of law and order,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 13 December 2001 (S/2001/1195), and taking note of the request by the National Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone to the United Nations to provide support for the elections,

1. *Decides* that, further to paragraph 8 (i) of resolution 1270 (1999) of 22 October 1999, in order to facilitate the smooth holding of elections, UNAMSIL shall undertake election-related tasks within the parameters set out in paragraphs 48 to 62 of the Secretary-General's report of 13 December 2001 (S/2001/1195), within its

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existing mandate, capabilities and areas of deployment and in the light of conditions on the ground, and decides that these tasks shall include:

(a) Assisting with logistic support to the National Electoral Commission for the transport of electoral materials and personnel, including the use of the air assets of UNAMSIL to reach areas inaccessible by road, the storage and distribution of election materials prior to the elections, the movement of ballot papers after the elections, logistic assistance to international election observers, and the use of the civilian communications facilities of UNAMSIL in the provinces;

(b) Facilitating the free movement of people, goods and humanitarian assistance throughout the country;

(c) The provision of wider security and deterrence, through its presence and within the framework of its mandate, throughout the period of preparation for the elections, the polling period itself, and the period immediately after the announcement of the election results, and, exceptionally, being prepared to respond to situations of public disorder, with the Sierra Leone police taking the lead, especially in the vicinity of polling stations and the locations of other related activities;

2. *Reiterates* its authorization to UNAMSIL, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, as provided for in resolution 1270 (1999) of 22 October 1999 and resolution 1289 (2000) of 7 February 2000, to take the necessary action to fulfil the tasks set out in paragraphs 1 (b) and 1 (c) above, and reaffirms that, in the discharge of its mandate, UNAMSIL may take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone, including the Sierra Leone Police;

3. *Authorizes* the increase in the United Nations civilian police proposed by the Secretary-General in his report of 13 December 2001 (S/2001/1195), encourages the Secretary-General to request a further increase if appropriate, and endorses the Secretary-General's recommendation that the United Nations civilian police should perform the following tasks:

(a) To advise and support the Sierra Leone Police in carrying out their election-related responsibilities;

(b) To assist the Sierra Leone Police to devise and implement an electoral training programme for their personnel, focused mainly on establishing security for public events, human rights and police conduct;

4. *Welcomes* the interim establishment of an electoral component in UNAMSIL aimed at strengthening UNAMSIL's contribution to facilitating, in particular, the coordination of electoral activities between the National Electoral Commission, the Government of Sierra Leone and other national and international stakeholders;

5. *Welcomes* the intention of UNAMSIL, as indicated in the Secretary-General's report of 13 December 2001 (S/2001/1195), to establish in each electoral region a UNAMSIL electoral office from which to monitor the electoral process, and to provide, within available resources, assistance to international election observers;

6. *Notes with appreciation* the ongoing support provided by the Public Information Section of UNAMSIL to the National Electoral Commission in designing and implementing a civic education and public information strategy, and encourages UNAMSIL to continue these efforts;

7. *Underlines* the responsibility of the Government of Sierra Leone and the National Electoral Commission for the holding of free and fair elections and encourages the international community to provide generous support and assistance to that end;

8. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.